

# GODOY'S ARMY



From  
Reason  
to  
Revolution  
1721-1815

NO.5

SPANISH REGIMENTS  
AND UNIFORMS  
FROM THE ESTADO  
MILITAR OF 1800

CHARLES ESDAILE & ALAN PERRY



Based on an extremely rare illustrated version of the Spanish Army's order of battle as it existed in the year 1800, this work cannot but form a most unusual addition to the collection of anyone interested in military uniforms (or, more specifically, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era). Most regiments of the Spanish Army are represented – including such extraordinary units as the Royal Corps of Cosmographic Engineers – while the beautiful full-page, hand-coloured engravings of the originals have been supplemented by a transcript of the details (in brief, the senior officers and the uniforms) given in the published edition of the army's order of battle, to which the album reproduced in the pages of this work was intended to complement.

Also included is an introduction to the Spanish Army in the period immediately preceding the Peninsular War – written by the leading expert on the subject – that will be of great interest to any student of that conflict; the soldiers seen in the book are, after all, pretty much the same as the soldiers who suddenly found themselves fighting Napoleon in 1808. A foreword by the current owner of the original – the well-known wargamer and figure designer Alan Perry – explains how the book came into his possession.



Professor Charles J. Esdaile is Britain's leading expert on the Peninsular War. The occupant of a Personal Chair in the Department of History at the University of Liverpool , he is the author of numerous works on Spain in the Revolutionary era, the Peninsular War of 1808-1814, and the Napoleonic Wars.

Alan Perry is a well-known figure designer and wargamer who is currently co-proprietor of Perry Miniatures.



# Godoy's Army

Spanish Regiments and Uniforms from the Estado Militar of 1800

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Charles Esdaile and Alan Perry



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# Foreword

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It's amazing what one finds when out antique hunting. My brother and I were closely inspecting a seventeenth-century gauntlet one day, when from the same cabinet, a marbled covered book which had completely passed us by was retrieved by my wife, Jill (she's very good at spotting rare books). When she opened the book and showed us, we were all blown away!

The first thing that struck us were the vibrant colours which seem as bright today as they must have done 200 years ago. Then, looking closely, we found there were quite a few completely hand-rendered plates alongside the hand-painted printed plates, this, too, being quite incredible! The gauntlet was put back in the cabinet and the book was promptly bought.

I then emailed René Chartand photos of all the plates. He confirmed it was a rare book indeed, maybe only one of three existing in the world of the same title from this period. Sometime later, Tim Adcock, a mutual friend of both myself and Andrew Bamford of Helion & Co., suggested it might be a worthy subject to print. Andrew asked the leading expert in Britain on the Spanish army of the period, Charles Esdaile, to write the text to go with the images and the rest is ... well, history!

Alan Perry, May 2017

# Introduction<sup>1</sup>

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On 20 May 1801 a large Spanish army invaded southern Portugal under the command of the royal favourite and erstwhile prime minister, Manuel de Godoy, or, to use his full title, the Prince of the Peace. Thus began a conflict that has gone down in history as the War of the Oranges. In brief, ruler of France since 1799, First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte was affronted by Portugal's refusal to break its ties with Britain, and threatened the Prince-Regent of Portugal, Dom João, with invasion if he did not immediately comply with his demands. With Spain France's ally since 1796, the government of King Charles IV came under immediate pressure to support the First Consul, and in the early months of 1801 a substantial army was concentrated around the border fortress of Badajoz, while, further north, a French division commanded by General Leclerc occupied Salamanca preparatory to marching on Almeida.

The Spanish army that crossed the River Caia and marched on Elvas – the great Portuguese fortress facing Badajoz across the frontier – consisted of a vanguard and four divisions, these being under the command of the Marqués del Socorro, Diego de Godoy (the brother of the Prince of the Peace), Ignacio Lencastre, Juan Caraffa, and Francisco-Javier Negrete. In all, they had some 30,000 men. Facing them were just 8,500 men of the Portuguese Army of the Alemtejo commanded by the Duque de Lafoes, together with another 10,000 men who were posted in garrison in Elvas, the smaller fortress of Campo Maior, and the hopelessly outmoded outposts of Olivença and Jerumenha. As for the Prince of the Peace, meanwhile, he was eager for glory and at the same time frantic to gain a victory before Leclerc's division got into action. It was therefore not to be very much of a conflict.

For the Spaniards, success was immediate. Closing up on Olivença and Jerumenha, neither of which were defended by more than a single battalion of infantry, Godoy's forces so overawed their governors that they surrendered without firing a shot, and by the end of the first day of the fighting Spanish troops had reached the outworks of Elvas where some famously plucked a basket of oranges, which their delighted commander sent as a present to Charles IV's wife, María Luisa. More staunchly held than Olivença and Jerumenha, Elvas refused to surrender and had to be blockaded, but the invading forces pressed on north and west, occupying a number of small villages and laying siege to Campo Maior.

The siege of Campo Maior gave rise to the one serious field action of the war. Concerned that the Portuguese field army would sooner or later be sufficiently reinforced to mount a relief expedition, Godoy ordered the Marqués del Socorro's vanguard to attack the nearest Portuguese outpost, namely an *ad hoc* brigade of infantry and cavalry stationed at Arronches. Drawn up in an arc around the town, Socorro's forces – a single artillery battery, the Cazadores de la Reina María Luisa light-cavalry regiment, the Gerona and First Regiment of Volunteers of Catalonia light-infantry regiments and one battalion of the Cazadores Voluntarios de la Corona infantry regiment – quickly closed in on the defenders. Deployed to hold the line of the River Caia as it wound around the spur on which the town stood, the Portuguese beat off an attempt by the Spanish cavalry to rush the bridge (an affair that gained the regiment concerned the scornful nickname of 'Mari-huye', or 'the Run-Away Marys'), but a second cavalry attack got across the river west of the town, and the defenders fled in disorder, having suffered some 200 casualties. Heavily bombarded, meanwhile, Campo Maior capitulated on 6 June, whereupon the Portuguese sued for peace, this last being obtained at the cost of the district of Olivença by means of the treaty of Badajoz signed two days later. Hostilities, in short, had lasted just eighteen days.<sup>2</sup> As for Godoy, he was ecstatic: 'I was born not to separate myself from the soldiery

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1 Part of the text of this introduction is taken from the chapter on the Spanish army submitted by the author to F.R. Schneid, *European Armies of the French Revolution, 1789-1802* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), and is reproduced here by kind permission of the editor. Schneid's book, meanwhile, is an obvious starting point for all those wishing to put the Spanish army in its wider context.

2 For a detailed account of the campaign of 1801, see M. Amaral, *Olivença. 1801: Portugal em Guerra do Guadiana ao Paraguai* (Lisbon: Tribuna da História, 2004).





*El Serenísimo Señor Príncipe de la Paz, Generalísimo, Grande Almirante de España é Indias.*

Engraving by Lopez after José Ribelles y Helip (Anne S.K. Brown Collection)



... Nothing is heard from them but "Long live our father and supreme commander!" Consoling their woes and animating their spirits as I do, there can be no doubt that the credit for their victories is down to me.<sup>3</sup>

Such was the War of the Oranges. Significant chiefly for the fact that it put an end to 150 years of petty conflict between Spain and Portugal and gave the former the borders which she enjoys today, this conflict has featured here because it is the campaign that can be most closely associated with the soldiers depicted in the wonderful work of which this forms the introduction. Though many of them would have fought in the war of 1793-95 against France and gone on to fight in the Peninsular War of 1808-14, they are dressed in the uniforms of 1801 and so it is to this period that this introduction will be addressed. So, of what did the army of King Charles IV consist? In brief, what we see is a typical army of the late eighteenth century, an army composed, like all others of the time, of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and supported, as in Britain and France, by a provincial militia. In terms of its composition, too, it was a force like most others, with a strong foreign component – there were many Swiss and also, notionally at least, Irish, Walloons and Italians – officers who came for the most part from the nobility, and rankers recruited, in part by conscription or even outright force, from among the urban and rural poor. Notable features included a distinctly out-sized royal guard and, more positively, a willingness to experiment with new ideas: that self-same guard had recently acquired a troop of horse artillery, while the war against France had boosted a long-standing interest in light infantry. Certain oddities aside, of course, we also see an army that looked like most of its contemporaries – the infantrymen shown in the prints could just as easily have mounted guard in Potsdam or Saint Petersburg as in Madrid and Barcelona – and fought like most of its contemporaries: as the sabres of the cavalry, smoothbore muskets of the infantry, and cannon and howitzers of the artillery were near-identical with those of every other European army, there was simply no space for anything else.

In the traditional British historiography of the Peninsular War, it is conventional to pour scorn on the Bourbon army. To quote Sir Charles Oman, for example, 'On the whole we cannot doubt that there was a mass of bad officers in the Spanish army: the ignorant fellows who had risen from the ranks, the too-rapidly-promoted scions of the *noblesse* and the nominees of Godoy's hangers-on were none of them very promising material.'<sup>4</sup> Such criticism, however, is unfair. In the words of a contemporary German observer, Friedrich Fischer:

However unfavourable the judgement of various travellers may be relative to the Spanish military, I am compelled from what I saw at Madrid, as well as at Cádiz, Barcelona and elsewhere, to contradict them. It is true the Spanish soldiers cannot be compared with those of Prussia and of Saxony ... but they are not wholly without some appearance ... and cannot be said to do their exercise ill ... Put them but in motion and they will make everything yield before them.<sup>5</sup>

The army had its problems, but for the most part these were problems shared by other eighteenth-century armies: one thinks here of 'sprigs of nobility' promoted too far, too fast; an officer corps that was frequently lacking in professional formation; artillery pieces without drivers; and engineers without sappers. Far more important was the unfavourable strategic context in which it had to operate. In brief, throughout the reign of King Charles III (1759-1788), the army had been very much a 'Cinderella service'. Preoccupied by the need both to protect the Spanish empire in America against the depredations of the British and to retain his alliance with France, Charles had poured resources into the navy, and by the end of his reign this had in terms of size become second only to those of London and Paris; indeed, the *Santísima Trinidad* was the largest ship in the world. However, with the régime committed to building a new battle fleet to fight the British, the amount of money available for the army was extremely limited: in 1770 the navy absorbed 12.1 per cent of the annual budget, in 1782 20 per cent, and in 1785 27.8 per cent, though in 1790 the figure was down to 20.7 per cent. To put this another way, given that defence spending overall remained roughly stable, in 1770 the army had been taking roughly twice as much money as the navy, whereas by 1790 the proportions had been reversed.<sup>6</sup>

So far as the army was concerned, the results of Charles III's emphasis on the navy was catastrophic. Left without an enemy to fight other than the Moors and, potentially, the Portuguese, the army saw its peace-time strength repeatedly slashed, whilst its place in the priorities of the state was graphically illustrated in 1777 when an attempt to replace the haphazard systems of recruitment of the past with an annual draft levied on an equitable basis from all

3 E. La Parra López, *Manuel Godoy: la aventura del poder* (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, 2002), p.305.

4 C. Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1902-30), Vol.I, p.100.

5 F.A. Fischer, *Travels in Spain in 1797 and 1798* (London: A. Strachan, 1802), pp.266-7.

6 J. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808* (Oxford: Blackwell 1989), p.316.

the provinces of Spain had to be abandoned in the wake of ferocious anti-conscription riots in Barcelona. When war broke out against France in 1793, then, the Army's worst problem was manpower. Seventy-seven strong according to the regulations of 1768, in 1771 each musketeer company was reduced to fifty-three men, whilst the following year it was decreed that in time of peace no regiment should have more than 400 rank and file (at the same time, it was also laid down that, every four months, half the infantry should be sent on leave).<sup>7</sup> Still worse, indeed, many units in effect disappeared altogether: according to one account, in the 1770s only six line infantry regiments could muster the two battalions laid down by the regulations.<sup>8</sup> Desperate to preserve peace with France, successive governments of the period 1789-93 had done nothing to fill up the gaps in the ranks, and so the army found itself marching off to war desperately understrength. In the first forces that invaded Roussillon, for example, the Regimiento de Infantería de Línea de Saboya numbered 884 men, the Regimiento de Infantería de Línea de Granada 870, and the Regimiento de Infantería de Línea de Valencia just 508.<sup>9</sup> Some reform was carried out at the last minute: the number of foreign line infantry regiments was halved and the *reformados* that resulted used to bring the remaining four units up to strength, whilst several new regiments were formed, including one regiment of Spanish line infantry and – interestingly – three regiments of light infantry, but Spain was anything but ready for war. So bad was the situation, indeed, that it is somewhat surprising that the troops were armed as well as they were: rather than ancient culverins left over from the seventeenth century, in 1783 the artillery had been supplied with the so-called Nueva Ordenanza – a standardised range of twelve, eight, and four-pounder guns and seven and nine-inch howitzers mounted on French-pattern Gribeauval carriages – while in 1789 a new model of musket had been given to the infantry; equivalent to the latest European models, these last were equipped with iron ramrods and a grooved frizzen (an important innovation that made for a much better chance of striking a spark) and had a calibre of 18mm as opposed to the 15mm of the previous model, their only serious drawbacks being that the distinctively upright hammer was easily broken and the trigger action notoriously stiff.<sup>10</sup>

Hardly surprisingly, in 1793 the recent combat history of the army, such as it was, was not a happy one: setting aside the unsuccessful siege of Gibraltar in the American War of Independence, an expedition to Algiers in 1775 had collapsed in complete chaos. Yet in the event the campaigns of 1793-95 were anything but a stain on its reputation. The invasion of Roussillon of March 1793 was reversed after just over a year by the Battle of Boulou on 1 April 1794, the French then going on to invade northern Catalonia and defeat the Spaniards again at Figueras in November, whilst at the western end of the Pyrenees the last months of the war saw hopelessly-outnumbered defending forces overrun in a blitzkrieg-style attack that took the forces of the Republic to the River Ebro. Yet in November 1793 Antonio Ricardos gained a significant victory in Roussillon at Trouillas, and in April and July 1795 French attempts to march on Barcelona were beaten back at the River Fluvià in the First and Second Battles of Bascara. And, as the Spanish forces were falling apart at one end of the Pyrenees in the last weeks of the war, at the other a daring counterstroke on the part of none other than that *bête noir* of British Peninsular War historians, Gregorio García de la Cuesta, led to the recovery of the isolated town of Puigcerdá despite the fact that it was deep in the French rear. If war weariness and bankruptcy led the government of Manuel de Godoy to make peace with France in July 1795 by the Treaty of Basel, the army's record was by no means dishonourable and certainly no worse than many of its contemporaries.<sup>11</sup>

That said, it was all too obvious that military reform was desperately needed. As the German observer, Joseph Texier, wrote:

7 Conde de Clonard, *Historia orgánica de las armas de infantería y caballería españolas desde la creación del ejército permanente hasta el día* (Madrid: D.B. Gonzalez, 1851-1862), Vol. V, pp. 291-309.

8 H. Swinburne, *Travels through Spain in the Years 1775 and 1776* (Dublin: S. Price, 1779), p. 25.

9 Estado Mayor Central del Ejército (ed.), *Campanas en los Pirineos a finales del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Servicio Histórico Militar 1949-59), Vol. II, pp. 131-3.

10 For the cannons and howitzers employed by the Spanish artillery, see J. Vigón, *Historia de la artillería española* (Madrid: Instituto Jerónimo Zurita, 1947), Vol. II, pp. 304-323 *passim*; limbers, caissons and gun-carriages were painted a light blue-grey. Meanwhile, details of the small arms used by the Spanish army may be found in M. Gómez Ruiz, *El Ejército de los Borbones* (Madrid: Servicio Histórico Militar, 1995), Vol. IV, pp. 582-9, and there are also some interesting remarks in W. Jacob, *Travels in the South of Spain* (London: J Johnson & Co., 1811), p. 166.

11 One should not, perhaps, make too much of the Spaniards' success. Other fronts always being far more important, the French troops who fought in the Pyrenees were starved of men, arms, supplies and even uniforms, while, in Griffith's words, the region 'would become famous for testing out all the many convoluted ways in which representatives on mission could possibly interfere with the military chain of command and sideline (or kill) its leading members'. P. Griffith, *The Art of War in Revolutionary France, 1789-1802* (Greenhill Books: London, 1998), p. 142.

The Spanish troops are ill clothed and worse shod ... Their bravery, docility, loyalty and steadiness are well known – have been demonstrated many times over even – but they require better discipline, better support and better officers if they are ever to become excellent soldiers.<sup>12</sup>

Prior to 1793, Spain could risk a defence policy based on a strong navy and a weak army, but thereafter this was no longer the case. Governed by a régime that was wedded to foreign war as a means of propping up its domestic position and, on occasion at least, inspired by visions of revolutionising the entire continent, France simply could not be trusted. In the short term, true, she could be bought off by the offer of a renewal of the alliance that had united Paris and Madrid against Britain, this deal being sealed by the Treaty of San Ildefonso of May 1796, but there could be no certainty in respect of the future, the fact being that henceforward Spain would need not just a strong navy, but also a strong army.<sup>13</sup> Of this, there was nobody more aware than the Spanish royal favourite and prime minister, Manuel de Godoy. A figure who has been universally derided in the traditional historiography, over the past thirty years Godoy has received a much better press. Certainly, his rise to power had been as rapid as it was controversial. Thus, a scion of the minor provincial nobility who had arrived in Madrid in 1784 as a mere trooper in the royal bodyguard (a rank that carried with it the rank of captain in the rest of the army: a common soldier Godoy was not), by 1792 Godoy was a grandee of Spain and a captain general – i.e. field marshal – of the army. That this was the result of nothing other than royal favour is perfectly clear, but what is far less self-evident is whether this favour stemmed from his prowess in the queen's bed-chamber: whilst there is no proof either way, the story that he was María Luisa's lover almost certainly owes its origins to rumours spread by his many enemies.<sup>14</sup>

General though he now was, Godoy was not to be given a chance to exercise such ability as he might have as a commander for some time, for in November 1792 he was suddenly appointed prime minister. By contrast with his promotion through the ranks of the army and the nobility, this was indeed something of a shock. Yet careful consideration of the circumstances renders even this understandable. When Charles IV came to the throne in 1788 he and his wife found the Spanish court deeply divided between the supporters of two rival camps, namely a reformist movement in large part composed of bureaucrats eager to drive forward the policies of enlightened absolutism favoured by Charles III, and a more conservative group who were determined to preserve the privileges of the nobility in the face of the creeping advance of royal reforms whose ultimate goal was to break the power of feudalism. In 1788 it had been the former group that had the upper hand in that its leader, the Conde de Floridablanca, was the prime minister, but in the spring of 1792 the increasing radicalization of the situation in France led the king to succumb to promises on the part of the leader of the conservative faction, the Conde de Aranda, of a new approach aimed at a reduction of the political tension across the frontier and make him prime minister instead. In the event, however, Aranda proved no more effectual than Floridablanca, and, much alarmed at the turmoil in the court – turmoil that he could not but compare to the divisions that had rent the *ancien régime* in 1789 – in November 1792 Charles IV decided that the best thing to do in the circumstances was to hand power to a man who both stood out above the constant faction-fighting and was wholly dependent upon him personally, the natural candidate being Manuel de Godoy.<sup>15</sup>

Still prime minister in July 1795, it was Godoy who was confronted by the issue of what to do about Spain's strategic situation. Much vilified though he has been, the Prince of the Peace as he was now known – a replacement for his existing title of Duque de la Alcudia, the title was a reward of a monarch grateful that he had extracted Spain from an exhausting and unpopular war at the cost of little more than the Caribbean island of Trinidad – was not the villain of legend. Certainly, he was venal and corrupt; certainly, he was vainglorious and apt to imagine himself a great commander; and, certainly too, he had a taste for women that, even if it did not extend so far as the queen, went far beyond his wife. That said, however, he was neither ignorant nor unintelligent, his extensive correspondence with the king and queen rather suggesting a man with a keen perception of the basic realities of Spain's position. To quote the favourite's most recent biographer, Emilio La Parra:

12 H. Friedrich-Stegmann, *La imagen de España en los libros de los viajeros alemanes del siglo XVIII* (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2014), p.132.

13 For all this, see E. La Parra López, *La alianza de Godoy con los revolucionarios: España y Francia a finales del siglo XIX* (Madrid: CSIC, 1992).

14 For all this, see A.J. Calvo Maturana, *María Luisa de Parma: reina de España, esclava del mito* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2007), pp.134-71.

15 For all this, see C. Seco Serrano, *Godoy: el hombre y el político* (Madrid: S.L.U., 1978), pp.47-51.



Godoy was above all a man of action. A natural politician, he had quickly adjusted to the customs of the court, and knew how to adapt to circumstances, whilst he never had any problems with changing the system when it suited him to do so ... Recent studies which have paid adequate attention to the historical context confirm that Godoy deserves a substantial part of the credit for the reformist impulse of the period 1792-98, and at the same time demonstrate that the [Spanish] Enlightenment did not end with the reign of Charles III, but achieved its maximum extent ... during the reign of his successor.<sup>16</sup>

In brief, perceiving all too well that France would sooner or later turn on Spain once more, all the favourite could do was to buy time for re-armament whilst at the same time using the French alliance as a means of staving off the ever-present British threat. Hardly had peace with France been signed, then, than Godoy was busying himself in a drive for military reform, one of his first actions in the wake of the Treaty of Basel being to establish a commission of senior officers charged with elaborating a raft of measures designed to bring the army up to scratch, the area that he placed most emphasis on here being to give Spain an adequate system of recruitment.<sup>17</sup>

In this, the royal favourite and chief minister was entirely right. Insofar as recruitment was concerned, Spain had been subject to various forms of compulsory military service ever since the seventeenth century, and in 1793 there were in fact two different systems in operation. Of these the first and most arbitrary was the so-called *leva*. As codified by an ordinance of 7 May 1775, the aim of this measure was both to provide men for the army and purge society of ne'er-do-wells and the destitute alike. Periodically, then, the authorities were authorised to arrest all men aged between 17 and 36 who were suspected of criminal activity, could not show that they were in permanent employment, had been causing trouble by drinking and brawling, or had in one way or another earned a reputation as a layabout or drifter, and march off those deemed capable of military service to the nearest regiment.<sup>18</sup> Last used in 1787, so brutal, arbitrary, and open to abuse was this system, which obviously bade fair to criminalise poverty and made the numerous class of day labourers vulnerable to enlistment at almost any time, that it cannot but have been much feared, but there is some evidence to suggest that the authorities, at least, believed that it was less unpopular than the more regular system of recruitment that had joined it in 1770 (or, at least, that the groups represented by its victims were so marginalised that they were unlikely to be able to cause much in the way of trouble). At all events, the *leva* was almost certainly the army's chief source of recruits: of 44,777 men who were detained as *vagos* in the period 1730-1789 and whose fate is known, no fewer than 24,889 were drafted into the ranks.<sup>19</sup>

What, though, of the system introduced in 1770? Known as the *sorteo* or *quinta*, this was essentially a ballot. In brief, the government was supposed to announce the number of recruits that it required, it then being the job of the provincial authorities to share the quota that had been assigned to them amongst the various municipalities contained within their jurisdiction. Having first established who was liable for military service, and whether or not they were physically fit to take up arms, the names of all those concerned would be read out one-by-one by the local justice of the peace, whilst a child drew a series of different coloured balls out of an urn, black meaning that the man whose name had just been called would have to go into the army and white that he could remain free. Great efforts were made in the regulations to ensure that the whole process was seen to be above board, but the opportunities for abuse were enormous, and it is quite clear that these were much made use of (with the aid of a little money, for example, it was always possible to obtain a doctor's note testifying to some suitably incapacitating medical condition). As one German visitor complained, indeed, 'In the process of recruitment there is a great deal of fraud, partiality and corruption.'<sup>20</sup> But even should no such chicanery take place, the system was unfair in itself. Nobles and members of the clergy were exempt, as were a long list of what in the Second World War would have been termed 'reserved occupations', whilst there were also a few geographical exemptions, including the city of Madrid and the Basque provinces. On a brighter and more egalitarian note, the regulations did show a laudable concern to protect those who were especially poor and vulnerable: indeed, anyone who could genuinely show that they were the sole support of their families in theory had nothing to fear, whilst married men were automatically exempted from the ballot. Nor, meanwhile, was the purchase of substitutes permitted. But this attempt to sweeten the pill counted for very little: in the end, the burden of conscription fell on a very much reduced section of the populace, and, what is

16 La Parra, *Manuel Godoy*, pp.167, 174.

17 C.J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp.39-41.

18 C. Borreguero Beltrán, *El reclutamiento militar por quintas en la España del siglo XVIII: orígenes del servicio militar obligatorio* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1989), pp.65-7.

19 R.M. Pérez Estévez, *El problema de los vagos en la España del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1976), pp.55-248 *passim*.

20 Friederich-Stegmann, *Imagen de España*, p.133.

more, on its very poorest elements. In this respect figures that we have for the judicial district of Burgos in 1773 tell their own story: in Orbaneja del Castillo, for example, the age group liable to compulsory military service contained sixteen unmarried men, but, of these, nine were exempt on account of their occupation, social class or personal circumstances, and another six medically unfit, with the result that there remained just one name for the ballot; meanwhile, in Herrera del Río Pisuerga, nine men were deemed both medically fit and liable for military service as opposed to 23 men who were categorised as invalids and another 24 who were covered by other types of exemption. In the district as a whole, what all this meant was that of 939 unmarried men of military age, only 231 were actually subjected to the *sorteo*.<sup>21</sup>

Not surprisingly, then, the *sorteo* was hated, and all the more so as the very same provinces to which it was subjected also had to provide all the men needed by the forty-three regiments of provincial militia. Nor was the reason for this hostility just that the system of recruitment was unfair. Soldiers had a very low reputation in society and were perceived as criminalised and drunken brutes who invariably ended up as beggars or bandits (in fact, the state did try to make provision for ex-soldiers through the maintenance of numerous companies of 'invalids' who were employed in garrison duties, but these do not appear to have been able to absorb all the men concerned). Even serving soldiers were not well looked after: with money for the army extremely short, they often went unpaid and unfed, one British observer describing them as 'dirty, melancholy dwarfs'.<sup>22</sup> To poor conditions, meanwhile, were added the physical brutality typical of many eighteenth-century armies, as well as a long series of more-or-less petty and humiliating restrictions and regulations. Soldiers, for example, were not allowed to smoke in public and were banned from streets and squares liable to be frequented by polite society.<sup>23</sup> However poor and desperate they were, few members of the rural populace – the overwhelming majority of the population – had any desire to leave their native towns and villages. And, finally, the loss of a son to the army meant the loss of a useful pair of hands on the family small-holding or a useful contribution to the family's income. Anti-conscription riots, then, were fairly frequent, whilst many men went into hiding, fled their homes and even mutilated themselves rather than risk being called up.<sup>24</sup> To make matters worse, this discontent was reflected in the propertied classes: whilst landowners, clergymen, men of letters, local magistrates and town councillors might not have had to worry about the *sorteo* themselves, they were understandably concerned at the threat that it posed to public order and even believed that it was injurious to public health. In order to avoid the risk of conscription, for example, many men got married very young, and this was supposed to increase the risk of having handicapped children; equally – and with more veracity – military service was seen as carrying with it very high risks of venereal disease.<sup>25</sup>

In the face of this massive hostility, the régime of Charles III was in 1777 forced to abandon its preferred policy of the annual imposition of the *sorteo* in favour of more traditional methods. Setting aside the *leva* – itself a measure that was not to be imposed lightly – this implied a reliance on voluntary enlistment. However, as a system this carried with its own difficulties. Thus, the only available sources of recruits were all likely to increase hostility to military service. Like many other states of the period, Spain strained every nerve to recruit foreign manpower for its armed forces, whether it was by means of contracting with the Catholic cantons of Switzerland for the upkeep of the army's four Swiss regiments, or by encouraging the recruitment of foreign deserters and draft evaders. However, attitudes to military service being much the same in most of the states of Europe, the trouble with such recruits was that they were what one visitor to Spain termed 'a most wretched crew' and another 'a mass of unfortunates'.<sup>26</sup> Nor was the situation much better with regard to those few soldiers that could be obtained on the home front, for, as the Frenchman, Laborde, observed, fresh blood was only to be found in spots that abounded in 'dupes and libertines'.<sup>27</sup> In short, in 1793 Spain's soldiers were the proverbial scum of the earth, the result being that the whole system appeared to be caught in a vicious downward spiral from which there seemed to be no escape.<sup>28</sup>

As elsewhere, however, poor human material did not necessarily make for bad soldiers. On the contrary, as one officer testified, the French found the Spanish forces to be anything but a walkover, their failure in the few battles in

21 Borreguero, *Reclutamiento militar*, pp.373-4.

22 Swinburne, *Travels*, p. 26.

23 *Ordenanzas de Su Majestad para el régimen, disciplina, subordinación y servicio de sus ejércitos* (Madrid: Antonio Marin, 1768), Vol. II, Section 1, Clauses 12-16.

24 Borreguero, *Reclutamiento militar*, pp. 317-28.

25 Borreguero, *Reclutamiento militar*, pp. 329-35; Esdaile, *Spanish Army*, p. 13.

26 W. Dalrymple, *Travels through Spain and Portugal in 1774* (London: J. Almon, 1777), p.65; Friedrich-Stegmann, *Imagen de España*, p.131.

27 A. Laborde, *A View of Spain* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1809), Vol.IV, p.505.

28 The most up-to-date view on the recruitment of the Spanish army in the eighteenth century is contained in F. Puell de la Villa, *El soldado desconocido: de la leva a la 'mili'* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1996), pp.47-98.

which they suffered serious defeats – the chief examples are Boulou and Figueras – having been the result of faulty strategy on the part of their commanders:

If ... it is felt that the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees was possessed of the greatest courage, that is but to do it justice, but to proceed from there to an assumption of Spanish cowardice would be to fall into the greatest of errors, and one that cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. In truth, I declare that I have never known men who were more patient, more sober, better disciplined or braver in battle than the Spanish soldiers I encountered. To these qualities, meanwhile, they added a great fund of national pride and a love of glory that carried them to the heights of exaltation ... Their misfortunes ... came from their absolute confidence in their cannons, their ramparts, their endless fortifications, a confidence that is very dangerous if it is encouraged too much among the troops as it ends up persuading them that they do not have a chance if they are for any reason deprived of those defences. Yet to think that an army spread out in small groups along the whole length of its line of battle, and at the same time penned up in defensive positions and possessed of only the most limited capacity of movement can fight a general with even a minimal idea of manoeuvre with any hope of success is but an illusion! Is it not evident that, however strong the line is, there will always be somewhere where it can be penetrated, and that, once this is achieved, there is nothing for it but flight?<sup>29</sup>

That said, when Spain went to war in 1793, the regime quickly found itself in enormous difficulties. How was it to get the army up to strength in the face of such enormous public hostility? According to older views of the subject, the answer was found in preaching a holy war, a veritable crusade, indeed, against a Revolution that was perceived as being anti-clerical, if not downright anti-Christian. Thus, following a long period in which the authorities had discouraged discussion of events in France, the coming of hostilities was greeted by a torrent of propaganda in which generals, officials, ecclesiastics, and men of letters competed with one another to hurl abuse at the Revolution and call Spain to arms. In this, of course, they were joined by the thousands of French *émigrés*, whose number included many priests, who had fled across the Pyrenees since 1789. Such newspapers as there were were soon full of stories from France of riot, disorder and attacks on the interests of property and the Church, not to mention scornful depictions of Robespierre's 'Cult of the Supreme Being', whilst pastoral letters, pamphlets, articles, and poetic odes united in portraying the Revolutionaries as *sacrilegios*, *impíos*, the spawn of Satan and outright madmen, and the events of 1789-92 as the fruit of some devious masonic or even Protestant plot.<sup>30</sup> Nor was the war against the Revolution conducted solely on paper: well aware that levels of literacy in Spain were very low, the ecclesiastical authorities sent out hundreds of friars to proclaim the need for a holy war in *plazas mayores* all over the country, whilst many parish priests, too, preached sermon after sermon in which the message was driven home still further. In Catalonia, at least, meanwhile, recruiting agents entitled *promotores de la defensa de la religión y de la patria* were sent out to encourage recruitment. And, or so it is claimed, no sooner was a crusade preached, than a crusade was embarked upon. All over the country volunteers came forward, or so it is said, by the thousand, whilst the actual arrival of French troops on Spanish soil turned torrent into tidal wave, the whole of Spain being energised by the horror stories – many of them all too justified – that emanated from Catalonia, Guipúzcoa, and Navarre.<sup>31</sup>

In reality, however, things were very different. There was some voluntary enlistment, certainly, but the lists of patriotic contributions that appear in the Spanish press of the epoch suggests that the motivation of the men concerned had little to do with either love of Spain or hatred of the French. Let us here consider, for example, one such list that relates purely to the efforts of Catalonia. The naval official, Josep Antoni Font, we read, provided one volunteer for the army; Bernabé González Chaves, a knight of the Order of Carlos III, Antonio Casamores, and Antonio Arnaldo three more in the person of their sons; José Bosque and Jaime Estévez, both of whom were residents of Lérida, one more apiece; the magistrate of Batea fifteen more and so on. Also notable are the many references that are made to the provision of bounties for the recruitment of common soldiers: the Barón de Castellnou, for example, laid down a golden *onza* to recruit two soldiers. There are a few examples of men offering their own persons for service in the army, but one suspects that this was as much as anything an attempt to secure a commission – traditionally, men of noble origin unable to obtain a position as a cadet could enlist as *soldados distinguidos* in the hope of becoming an officer later on – the fact being that the 'voluntary' enlistment that took place was often not voluntary at all. Thus,

29 P. de Bourgoing (ed.), *Souvenirs militaires du Général Comte de Lorencez* (Paris: Émile-Paul, 1902), pp. 16-20.

30 For a good example of this literature, one might cite D.J. de Cádiz, *El soldado católico en guerra de religión* (Ecija: Benito Daza, 1794), a furious diatribe whose subtitle proclaimed it to contain detailed instruction as to how Spain's soldiers should conduct themselves whilst fighting the 'infidel, seditious and regicide assembly of France'.

31 There is a classic statement of the traditional view in R. Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp.297-315.



what we see is almost certainly prominent citizens of Barcelona and other cities pressurising dependents of various sorts – tenants, employees, servants, sons – into taking up arms, and, beyond that, the rural and urban poor being cajoled into enlisting in exchange for a handful of *reales*.<sup>32</sup> This is also true of examples that can be found from the province of Valencia. When we are told, for instance, that the monastery of Valldigna supplied fifty soldiers for the cause, one can only suppose that they were drawn from the families of men working their lands as peasant farmers, and that it was again economic pressure that was used to ensure compliance with the demands of the abbot.<sup>33</sup> And where men did come forward voluntarily, they often offered themselves for service not in the army, but in the navy, which in the circumstances of 1793-95 was hardly a central pillar of the Spanish war effort: Blas Carbonell, indeed, informs us that the majority of the province of Valencia's 2,192 volunteers went to the navy.<sup>34</sup>

To make up the shortfall, the régime responded in a number of ways. In the Basque provinces and Catalonia, for example, local traditions of self-defence were exploited so as to form irregular militias that, at least in theory, dedicated themselves to fighting a guerrilla war in the Pyrenees, though it should be noted that these men were not volunteers, but rather conscripts. Catalonia also saw an attempt to form a large volunteer army by the offer of special terms of service: enlistment, for example, was for the duration of the war only, while the men were promised that they would not have to serve beyond the frontiers of their native province.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, as elsewhere, use was also made of French deserters and *émigrés*: amongst the troops whose served in Catalonia was a unit entitled the Legión Real commanded by the Marquis de Saint Simon (we shall later encounter this unit as the Regimiento de Borbón). But in the end none of these expedients were sufficient and Godoy was therefore left with no option but to resort to traditional methods: both a *sorteo* and a *leva* were ordered as early as February 1793, whilst a further *sorteo* was imposed two years later after a call for 40,000 volunteers made the previous year had proved a complete failure, and that despite the fact that all those who came forward enjoyed generous bounties as well as higher rates of pay than the soldiers of the old army.<sup>36</sup>

In short, at the end of the war against France Godoy was faced with a significant problem. Whilst it had been shown that, even sweetened by generous conditions and boosted by propaganda, voluntary enlistment was unlikely ever to meet the army's requirements in terms of manpower, it was just as clear that Spain's existing system of conscription was not only deeply unpopular with the masses, but incapable of providing the number of men the army needed. To all this, Godoy came up with an ingenious solution. In brief, Spain would have two armies, of which the first – the royal guards, the cavalry, the artillery, the light infantry, and the first battalions of the infantry regiments – would be raised entirely by voluntary enlistment, and the second – two additional battalions for each line-infantry regiment – recruited by means of a *sorteo* extended to cover the entire country. So far, it might be thought, so conventional, but there was an important twist in that, whereas all the volunteers would serve on a permanent basis, after a short period of basic training the conscripts would be released to their homes and thereafter only have to turn out for annual 'camps of instruction', a further proposal being that, as the new arrangement would render the existing provincial militia (a force that was also recruited by conscription) redundant, it could be got rid of, thereby both reducing the demands of the army on the populace and saving the state a considerable sum of money. Whether this scheme would have given Spain an efficient army, or reduced hostility to military service, are moot points, as in the event the whole issue fell by the wayside. Not only were there serious military objections to Godoy's plans, but King Charles IV was terrified that the upset to the many vested interests that they threatened was far too dangerous to contemplate and in July 1796 he suspended the sittings of the prime minister's commission of reform, two months later dissolving it altogether.<sup>37</sup>

With this action was lost all chance of root and branch reform, but Godoy remained undaunted, and threw himself into the task of revivifying the army piecemeal. Very high on the list of his priorities were, first, the army's strength and, second, its performance on the battlefield. With regard to the first of these issues, a fresh source of recruits was found in the large number of Austrian prisoners who had been taken by Napoleon in the Italian campaign of 1796, so many of these unfortunate men being persuaded to volunteer for the Spanish army that one third of the

32 Estado Mayor Central del Ejército, *Campañas en los Pirineos a finales del siglo XVIII*, Vol. II, Part 2, pp.69-75.

33 M. Blas Carbonell, *La aportación valenciana a la guerra de 1793-95* (Valencia: Diputació de Valencia, 1996), p.20.

34 Carbonell, *La aportación valenciana*, p.21.

35 See for example J. Fabregas Roig, *La Guerra Gran, 1793-1795: el protagonisme de Girona i la mobilització dels miquelets* (Lérida: Pagès Editors, 2000).

36 S. Sánchez (ed.), *Colección de todas las pragmáticas, cédulas, provisiones, autos acordados y otras providencias publicados en el actual reinado del Señor Don Carlos IV* (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda e Hijo de Marín, 1794-1801), Vol. I, p.307; *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 2-15, 102-4; J.F. de Bourgoing, *A Modern State of Spain* (London: J. Stockdale, 1808), Vol. III, pp.243, 294.

37 For all this, see Esdaile, *Spanish Army*, pp.42-4.

rank and file of some regiments were said to be made up of Austrians (a word that encompassed not just Germans, but also Italians, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, and Croats).<sup>38</sup> At the same time, a warm welcome was given to the streams of foreign deserters who fled across the frontier from Portugal where they had been serving in a number of *émigré* regiments, and two new Swiss regiments were raised to join the four in service in 1793, though, again, the men concerned were Austrian prisoners of war.<sup>39</sup> Meanwhile, in a move that added six regiments to its strength, the provincial militia was extended to the hitherto exempt province of Valencia.<sup>40</sup> With the shortage of manpower at least partly ameliorated, there remained the question of the army's tactics, and Godoy attempted to deal with this by setting up 'camps of instruction' at Cáceres, Algeciras, and San Roque in an attempt to improve the army's training, it being during the course of the resultant manoeuvres that the army conducted the experiments with horse artillery reflected in the plates.<sup>41</sup>

A further purposes of the 'camps of instruction' was to improve the quality of the officer corps. In fairness, the war of 1793-95 had shown that many Spanish officers were lacking in neither courage nor competence, but the officer corps was nonetheless dogged by many problems. In the first place, training was clearly inadequate. A number of small military academies had been established in the course of the eighteenth century, but by 1793 almost all of them had ceased to exist whilst they had only ever catered for a minority of the men involved. Most officers, then, only received instruction 'on the job', and this was all too often barely adequate. And, in the second place, promotion was often extremely slow. Paradoxically, the Spanish army was much more egalitarian in its approach to granting commissions than many other forces of the epoch. Thus, no fewer than one third of its numbers was supposed to come from men promoted from the ranks, and this implied, in turn, that many officers were non-noble: according to a list of 30 captains who were awaiting promotion in the year 1813, of the 22 who had been officers before 1808, six had enlisted as common soldiers, nine as cadets, four as sub-lieutenants in the provincial militia, two as gentlemen volunteers, and the last had been a page in the royal household who had been commissioned directly as a captain.<sup>42</sup> For non-nobles, however, promotion, which rested on a complicated mixture of favour and seniority, did not come easily, and they generally languished for many years in the lower ranks, the most that they could aspire to being a captaincy. In practice, high rank was reserved for men who entered the army as officer cadets, the usual age of entry being around fourteen. Such candidates had to be both noble and sufficiently moneyed to be able to support their expenses. This was not quite as socially exclusive as it sounds – around one tenth of the population could claim to be noble – but in terms of the officer corps' internal dynamics it was disastrous. Particularly if they enjoyed the favour of the court, such men could rise very rapidly – sometimes extremely rapidly – and thus it was that important commands sometimes fell into the hands of men who were both very young and very inexperienced. But precisely because of this court favour, not to mention a variety of other problems which are too complicated to go into here, for most officers there was little reward in the way of advancement. Nor, meanwhile, was pay especially good, and all the more so as the fixed salaries enjoyed by the officer corps were by 1790 being eroded by galloping inflation. As to the effects of all this, they were only to be expected. Boredom, cynicism, and disillusion were all too common, whilst indiscipline, too, was a constant problem. Hence the very large number of officers who were absent from their regiments when the war broke out: of 112 officers serving with the four battalions of Guardias Españolas, for example, no fewer than 71 were missing, whilst the single battalion of the Regimiento de Infantería de Línea de Málaga that was present on the frontier was in even worse straits with just two officers present out of 24.<sup>43</sup>

In seeking to reform the officer corps, however, Godoy was again to be frustrated. Dependent from the very beginning on the royal favour, the prime minister could only push his reforms as far as he was permitted to do so, whilst his many enemies in the court – a group that was particularly numerous in the military aristocracy on account of its association with Godoy's ousted predecessor, the Conde de Aranda – were constantly pouring poison into the royal ear in his respect. With the French ambassador also hostile to a man who he rightly believed to be less than one hundred per cent in his commitment to the alliance with Paris, by the first months of 1798 the writing was on the wall for the prime minister, and on 28 March Godoy therefore resigned from his position. The result was that all reform

38 Fischer, *Travels in Spain*, p.269.

39 Fischer, *Travels in Spain*, pp.265-6.

40 Esdaile, *Spanish Army in the Peninsular War*, p. 45.

41 Esdaile, *Spanish Army in the Peninsular War*, p. 45.

42 University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, 1/382: 'Subinspección de Infantería del Cuarto Ejército: relación de los capitanes que no han sido promovidos a jefes', 1 February 1813.

43 Estado Mayor Central, *Campanas en los Pirineos*, I, p. 132. For detailed discussions of the officer corps, see Esdaile, *Spanish Army*, pp.14-24; J.L. Terrón Ponce, *Ejército y política en la España de Carlos III* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, 1997), pp.43-80, and F. Andujar Castillo, *Los militares en la España del siglo XVIII: un estudio social* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1991), pp.121-325.

came to an end, leaving the Spanish army barely capable even of taking on a foe as insignificant as Portugal. As the Marqués de Casa-Cagigal complained in the wake of Godoy's departure, 'At present our army is a weak skeleton, incapable of taking the field should this become necessary, small in numbers, lacking in training, and unprovided with everything that is necessary for its operations'.<sup>44</sup>

The resignation of Godoy as prime minister in March 1798 is not the end of his story: on the contrary, within a matter of months he was back in the bosom of Charles IV and María Luisa and thus it was that March 1801 saw him heading the army sent to attack Portugal. Nor, meanwhile, was it the end of Spain's attempts to come to terms with the military challenge of the French Revolution. On the contrary, buttressed by his success in the War of the Oranges, Godoy was appointed to a new role as *generalísimo* of the Spanish army – a role that is sometimes interpreted as commander-in-chief, but was actually rather one that conveyed absolute authority in respect of the army's internal structures and regulations – and spent the next few years attempting in a somewhat spasmodic fashion and ineffectual fashion to resume the task which he had embarked upon. The result, of course, was that the army that found itself facing the French when Napoleon decided to overthrow the Bourbons was no more prepared for war than the one that found itself facing Portugal in 1801: as the British visitor, George Whittington, remarked in a work published in 1808, 'The Spanish army exists chiefly on paper. By the official lists it ought, in 1789, to have consisted of 103,437 men, and in 1794 of 114,000, but I do not believe that it at present exceeds 80,000'.<sup>45</sup> Having been told elsewhere, this story is not one that need concern us here, however. Suffice to say that the faces of the men who look out at us from the remarkable volume presented here are the faces of men for whom military service was for the most part an affair that was miserable, unrewarding, and possessed of precious little in the way of glory.

So much for the context, but what of the album on which this work is based? In brief, what we have is one of a series of *estados militares gráficos* that were produced to accompany the *estado militar*, or order of battle, that was published every year in the official almanac, the *Kalendario manual y guía de forasteros en Madrid*, it being from this source (to be precise, the volume for 1800) that all the details respecting senior officers, etc., are taken. However, unlike the printed version, the hand-coloured *estado militar gráfico* was not released to the general public, but was rather produced in very small numbers, and then, as in the case of the example featured here, only in manuscript form: it is therefore safe to say that the official version would only have featured in the libraries of the very highest dignitaries of the state, though it is just possible that wealthy aristocrats may have commissioned private versions of their own. The style of the figures varied from the extremely crude to the extremely detailed,<sup>46</sup> and we are therefore fortunate that the 1800 edition very much belongs to the superior end of the scale: not only is the quality of the artwork outstanding, but each unit has its own page, this last being something that is very far from the case with the other examples that have been examined. That said, not everything is rosy, for the work is seriously incomplete – absences include the artillery, the engineers, fifteen regiments of infantry and eight regiments of cavalry – and, still worse, lacking a title page, the result being that it is impossible to date the work with any certainty: whilst 1800 is a working hypothesis, the year involved could just as easily be 1798, 1799, or 1801.

If the nature of the work is easy enough to establish, how did so rare a piece end up on the shelves of a bookshop in Doncaster? A precise answer to this question is impossible, of course, but it is at least possible to hazard a guess as to how the work escaped from Spain. In brief, given his interests, the author will be forgiven for suggesting that there may well be a link with the Peninsular War. Thus, let us assume that the most likely scenario is that in 1808 this particular *estado militar gráfico* was sitting on a shelf in the library of the Ministry of War or even the royal palace. As such, it would beyond doubt have fallen into the hands of the forces of Napoleon. If so, however, it is probable that it did not do so for very long, in which respect there are two chief possibilities. First of all, we have the liberation of Madrid by the Anglo-Portuguese army in 1812, in the course of which the fortress constructed by the French to overawe the populace on the heights occupied by what is today the Retiro Park was looted by British troops. Secondly, we have the still-more-glorious ransacking of the French baggage train, and with it all the immense amount of plunder of every sort that the French took with them when they evacuated the capital, that took place in the wake of the battle of Vitoria. In the case of Vitoria, in particular, many accounts speak of the ground being littered with discarded books and manuscripts, and it is by no means inconceivable that some enterprising private was attracted by so colourful an item and stuffed it into his haversack in the hope that he could later sell it to one

44 Real Academia de Historia, 2-MS135, No. 6: Marqués de Casa-Cagigal, 'Prospecto de un plan de ejército suficiente a hacer respetable a España según exigen las actuales circunstancias'.

45 G. Whittington, *Travels through Spain and a Part of Portugal* (Boston: White, Burbitt, & Co., 1808), p.218. For Godoy's policies in the period 1801-1808, see Esdaile, *Spanish Army*, pp.47-56.

46 As witness the various examples that may be viewed via the internet – the website of the estimable Alfons Cánovas is particularly useful; see 'Miniaturas Militares' at <http://miniaturasmilitaresalfonscanovas.blogspot.co.uk/>.



of his officers. Or was it simply picked up by an officer and brought away as a souvenir? Here, too, perhaps, lies an explanation for the missing pages: for all we know, the work may not have been bound until after the Napoleonic Wars, the result being that in 1813 it consisted merely of a sheaf of manuscript, some of which was left trampled in the mud. Or were – perish the thought! – the missing pages ripped out to deal with the results of having had to answer the calls of nature? We shall never know, but to speculate is irresistible.

Before moving on to address the plates and the regiments depicted in them, it may be worth offering a few words of explanation in respect of the notes, since these include details that may otherwise seem confusing to the reader. Insofar as regimental ranks were concerned, the structure was exactly the same as in most other European armies, namely ensign, sub-lieutenant, lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel. The one point of potential confusion is the figure of the *sargento-mayor*. This has been rendered as ‘sergeant-major’, but it was not equivalent to the British rank of that name, but rather a position occupied by a senior officer who functioned in the dual role of brigade-major and adjutant. However, at the level of the command of a regiment, the system was complicated by the fact that the three senior positions – those of colonel, lieutenant-colonel and sergeant major – were appointments. In consequence, in the names of senior officers provided here, the colonel of a regiment might easily be a brigadier; the lieutenant colonel a colonel, and the sergeant major a lieutenant colonel. Finally, in the descriptions of the uniforms, it will be noted that there is little mention of headgear. In general, most troops wore cocked hats, but in the infantry grenadiers wore bearskin caps with cloth bags of the regimental facing colour decorated with the regimental crest hanging from the rear.

## Royal Guard

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In 1800 Spain possessed one of the largest royal guards in Europe. Setting aside the ceremonial company of halberdiers who mounted guard over the various royal palaces, this consisted of the four-company-strong Guardias de Corps, the mounted bodyguard that accompanied the royal family on their periodic peregrinations from one royal residence to the next; the two regiments of foot guards – the Guardias Españolas and the Guardias Walonas – each of which had no fewer than six battalions, each of one company of grenadiers and six companies of fusiliers; a single six-company battalion of light infantry; a light cavalry regiment of four squadrons – the blue-clad Carabineros Reales – and a battery of horse artillery (the product, as we have seen, of Godoy's attempts at reform in the wake of the war of 1793-95) that was attached to the Guardias de Corps. Put together, this amounted to a force of well over 10,000 men, and its swollen proportions and renowned inefficiency – the rest of the army referred to its members as *chocolateros* (roughly, 'chocolate soldiers') – made it a favourite target of military reformers, including, not least, Manuel de Godoy. Given that the latter in 1804 succeeded in depriving each of the two infantry regiments of three of their six battalions, and, further, that the household troops as a whole were full of members of the military aristocracy – a good example is the Duque de Infantado – it is scarcely surprising that when Godoy was overthrown in a military coup at Aranjuez in March 1808, the Guards were in the van.

A particular note is needed in respect of the Guardias Walonas. Originally this was recruited from Wallonia – i.e. the largely Catholic and French-speaking region that makes up the southern part of present-day Belgium – but, as with the army's foreign line regiments, little was left of this arrangement but a scattering of officers with French or Flemish names, most of whom were second or even third-generation immigrants. Almost equally meaningless, one suspects, was the manner in which each of the four companies of the Guardias de Corps was associated with one particular area of Spain's historic dominions, namely Spain, America, Italy, and Flanders. What was significant, by contrast, was the manner in which ranks in the Guardias de Corps counted for much more insofar as the general army list was concerned: as we have seen, when Godoy enlisted as a trooper in the Spanish company in 1784 he immediately acquired the army rank of captain.





*Guardias de Corps, Compañía Americana*

One company; date of formation 1704; uniform: blue coat with scarlet collar, lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, and lining, and silver buttons and piping; scarlet waistcoat; blue breeches; purple bandolier picked out in silver.

Captain: Lieutenant General the Count of Villariego.

First Lieutenant: Major General Don Francisco de Córdoba.

Second Lieutenant: Brigadier Don Melchor Calatayud.

Ensign: Brigadier Don Antonio de Zayas.





*Guardias de Corps, Compañía Flamenca*

One company; date of formation 1704; uniform: blue coat with scarlet collar, lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, and lining, and silver buttons and piping; scarlet waistcoat; blue breeches; yellow bandolier picked out in silver.


Captain: Lieutenant General the Prince of Maserano.

First Lieutenant: Major General Don Felipe Beaufort.

Second Lieutenant: Brigadier Don Armando Latouret.

Ensign: Brigadier Don Nicolas Mahy.





*Guardias de Corps, Compañía de Artillería a Caballo*

One company, date of formation 1798; uniform: short blue jacket with scarlet cuffs, turnbacks, collar and lining and piping and white-metal buttons; scarlet waistcoat; full-length blue leggings with half-boots; round hat with white-metal trim.

Commanding officer: Colonel Don Vicente María de Maturana.





*Guardias de Infantería Española*


Seven battalions; date of formation 1704; uniform: blue coat with scarlet cuffs, turnbacks and lapels, and white-metal buttons; scarlet waistcoat; and blue breeches (officers wore the uniform of the Guardias de Corps with the difference that the collar was blue).

Colonel: Lieutenant General the Duke of Osuna.

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant General Don Manuel de Arista y Morón.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant General the Marquess of Valbuena.





*Guardias de Infantería Española, Batallón de Cazadores*

An oddity of this regiment was the inclusion of a six-company battalion of cazadores – that had been raised at the behest (and personal cost) of its commander, the Duque de Osuna, in 1793 in response to the demands of fighting the French Revolution.





*Guardias de Infantería Walona*

Six battalions; date of formation: 1704; uniform: blue coat with scarlet cuffs, turnbacks and lapels, and white-metal buttons; scarlet waistcoat; and blue breeches (officers wore the uniform of the Guardias de Corps with the difference that the collar was blue).

Colonel: Lieutenant General the Prince of Castelfranco.

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant General the Baron de Staimbourg.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant General Don Pedro Fort de Saint-Maurin





*Carabinieros Reales*

Four squadrons; date of formation: 1730; uniform: blue coat with blue lapels, scarlet collar, cuffs, turnbacks, and lining, and silver buttons and piping; scarlet waistcoat; blue breeches;

Commandant: Lieutenant General Don Antonio de Córdoba y Heredia.

Second-Commandant: Lieutenant General Don José Iturrigaray.

Sergeant Major: Brigadier Don Pedro Espejo.

*Guardias de Corps, Compañía Española*

One company; date of formation 1704; uniform: blue coat with scarlet collar, lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, and lining, and silver buttons and piping; scarlet waistcoat; blue breeches; red bandolier picked out in silver.

Captain: Lieutenant General the Marquess of Albudeyte.

First Lieutenant: Major General Don Salvador Perellos.

Second Lieutenant: Brigadier Don Francisco Barradas.

Ensign: Brigadier Don Pedro Vicente.

*Guardias de Corps, Compañía Italiana*

One company; date of formation 1704; uniform: blue coat with scarlet collar, lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, and lining, and silver buttons and piping; scarlet waistcoat; blue breeches; green bandolier picked out in silver.

Captain: Lieutenant General the Duke of Lancaster.<sup>1</sup>

First Lieutenant: Lieutenant General Don José Sextí.

Second Lieutenant: Major-General Don Carlos Mori.

Ensign: Major General Don Antonio Gregorio.

*Guardia de Alabarderos*

One company; date of formation 1707; uniform: blue cape; blue coat with scarlet collar, turnbacks and lining and a line of gold braid on the collar and cuffs; scarlet waistcoat; blue breeches (officers also have scarlet lapels and silver aiguillettes).

Captain: Lieutenant General the Duke of Albuquerque.

Lieutenant: Major General Don Antonio Calatayud.

Sub-Lieutenant: Brigadier Don Vicente Casasola.

Adjutant: Brigadier Don Santiago Lusarreta.

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<sup>1</sup> This title should not be confused with the similar one attached to this day to the sovereign of the United Kingdom. Rather, it was an entirely separate Spanish title conferred upon the individual concerned, Agustín de Lancaster y Araciél, in 1799 in recognition for his recent services as Captain General of Catalonia. However, the Lancaster family did have connections with the British royal family, being descended from Catherine of Lancaster, a daughter of John of Gaunt who married Henry III of Castile in 1388.



## Line Infantry

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In 1800 the Spanish infantry consisted of thirty-nine regiments, most of which consisted of three battalions, though a few regiments appear to have had only one. In order of seniority, the regiments were named Rey, Reina, Príncipe, Saboya, Corona, Africa, Nápoles, Zamora, Soria, Córdoba, Guadalajara, Sevilla, Granada, Valencia, Zaragoza, España, Toledo, Mallorca, Burgos, Murcia, León, Irlanda, Cantabria, Asturias, Fijo de Ceuta, Navarra, Hibernia, Ultonia, Aragón, América, Princesa, Extremadura, Málaga, Jaén, Ordenes Militares, Voluntarios de Castilla, Granaderos Voluntarios de Estado, Cazadores Voluntarios de la Corona, and Borbón. The most senior of them, the Regimiento del Rey, had no date of creation as it was held to have existed since time immemorial. However, in practice, it may be dated to the creation of the first permanent *tercios* in 1537.

Each battalion was divided into eight musketeer and one grenadier companies, but in wartime the former were drawn off to form separate élite battalions. Three of the regiments were Irish – those of Irlanda, Hibernia and Ultonia – one more – that of Nápoles – Italian, and yet another – that of Borbón – French, but, unlike in 1808, when the foreign line went to war against the French dressed in sky-blue coats, in 1800 they wore the same white as the rest of the army. As for the composition of these foreign contingents, only the Borbón regiment – a very recent addition to the army's order of battle based on a unit of French émigrés – bore any relation to its origins: in the other four regiments, while the rank and file may have included a fair number of foreign deserters and other flotsam-and-jetsam, very few, if any, were either Irish or Italian, the only thing that marked them out being a disproportionate number of officers with Irish or Italian names, in the case of the former these being the grandsons or even great-grandsons of the original 'wild geese' of the late seventeenth century.

In theory, one of the regiments – that of the Voluntarios de Estado – was composed of grenadiers, and another – that of the Voluntarios de la Corona – *cazadores* or chasseurs, but both of them had been raised in the course of the war of 1793-95 and the titles appear to have been no more than an honorific designed to make them a little more attractive to potential recruits. Finally, the Fijo de Ceuta regiment was a garrison unit whose service was ordinarily confined to the defence of the North African outpost of that name.

With regard to its tactics, the Spanish line infantry fought in much the same style as the Prussian forces on which they were largely modelled. Thus, the three-deep line was the standard tactical formation, its role being steadily to advance upon the enemy, firing repeated volleys as it did so, before charging with the bayonet. When fighting cavalry, the array adopted was either the square or the *sólido*, a variant of the battalion-column in which companies doubled their ranks and closed up very tightly on one another. As was normal, fire was generally delivered not by entire battalions all firing at once, but rather by files, companies or half-companies, the general effect being to ensure that no unit was ever completely unloaded.



*Regimiento de Infantería del Rey*

Three battalions; date of formation: 'immemorial'; uniform: white coat with purple lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet collar and piping and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Francisco Mendieta.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Pablo Martínez Toledano.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos de los Ríos.





*Regimiento de Infantería de la Reina*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1537; uniform: white coat with white lapels, cuffs, turn-backs and collar, scarlet piping and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier the Count of Saint Genois.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Joaquín Salgado.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Felix Martínez.





*Regimiento de Infantería del Príncipe*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1537; uniform: white coat with purple lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Manuel de Miranda.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Miguel Raón.

Sergeant Major: Colonel Don José Falqués.





*Regimiento de Infantería de la Corona*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1537; uniform: white coat with dark-blue lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping and white-metal buttons; a white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Mateo de Arriola.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel the Marquess of Casatremañes.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Gabriel Salamanca.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Africa*

Three battalions; date of formation 1559; uniform: white coat with black lapels, cuffs, turn-backs and piping, a white collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Antonio de Senra.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Juan de Aguirre.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Pedro Ruiz de Labastida.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Nápoles*


Three battalions; date of formation: 1572; uniform: white coat with scarlet cuffs, lapels and turn-backs, light blue collar and piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Marqués Gualengo.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Ulises Albergoti.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Tomas Moreno.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Soria*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1591; uniform: white coat with purple cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, white lapels and gilt buttons; a white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don José de Vargas.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José Amar.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Moya.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Córdoba*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1650; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, purple collar and piping, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Vidal Marín.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Juan-Carlos de Areizaga.<sup>1</sup>

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don José Bermúdez.

<sup>1</sup> In retirement in 1808, Areizaga joined the Patriot cause and in 1809 was rewarded with a division in the army Joaquín Blake led to defeat at María and Belchite. However, judged free of any guilt for these disasters in September 1809, he was appointed to the command of the largest Spanish army still in the field, only to preside over the destruction of this force at Ocaña on 19 November, a misfortune which he brought upon himself through his vacillating conduct and failure to provide effective command on the battlefield.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Guadalajara*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1657; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, and white-metal buttons; a white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Manuel Herck.<sup>1</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Ventura Moreno.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Moya.

<sup>1</sup> Governor of Olivenza in 1808, Herck was still occupying that position when the town was attacked by the French in January 1811. Possessed of little in the way of artillery and lacking modern fortifications, it was not susceptible of prolonged resistance, but it was nevertheless generally felt that Herck should have put up more of a fight than he did (in the event he surrendered to the French after a mere nine days). In consequence, not even the fact that, sixty-four years old though he was, he nevertheless managed to escape from captivity while he was being escorted to Seville, saved him from a court martial.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Granada*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1591; uniform: white coat with green lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, and white-metal buttons; a white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel the Marquess of Ariza.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel the Marquess of Zayas

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Isidro de Saso.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Zaragoza*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1660; uniform: white coat with green cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, white lapels and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Narciso de Pedro.

Lieutenant Colonel: Brigadier Juan de Courten

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Luis Beltrán





*Regimiento de Infantería de España*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1660; uniform: white coat with green lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Ramón de Carvajal.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Antonio Colas.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel de los Ríos.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Toledo*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1661; uniform: white coat with light blue lapels, cuffs, and turnbacks, scarlet collar and piping, and gilt buttons; a white waistcoat; and white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Alejandro Macarthy.

Lieutenant Colonel: vacant.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Nicolas Darcourt.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Burgos*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1694; uniform: white coat with purple lapels, cuffs, turn-backs and piping, a white collar and white-metal buttons; a white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Luis de la Carrera.

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan Desnaux.

Sergeant Major: vacant.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Murcia*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1694; uniform: white coat with light blue cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, white lapels, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Toribio de Montes.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José Berenguer.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Francisco Cortés.





*Regimiento de Infantería de León*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1694; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, white collar, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Ramón Fernández de Idarga.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Gracián Crespo.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Julián de Sequera.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Cantabria*

One battalion; date of formation: 1703; uniform: white coat with light blue lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Juan Christomo de la Llave.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Raimundo de Salazar.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Alvaro Armiñan.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Asturias*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1703; uniform: white coat with light blue cuffs, turn-backs and piping, white collar, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Luis Delevielleuze.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Manuel Biquet.

Sergeant Major: Colonel Don Francisco Fulgosio.





*Regimiento de Infantería Fijo de Ceuta*

One battalion; date of formation: 1703; uniform: white coat with green lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, buff collar and piping, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; and white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Manuel de Martín y Maroto.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Manuel Calderón.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Roque Tablada.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Navarra*

Three battalions; date of formation, 1705; uniform: white coat with light blue lapels, cuffs and turnbacks, scarlet collar and piping and white metal buttons; white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Juan O'Neill

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Marques de Casa-Palacio.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Francisco Cabrera.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Hibernia*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1709; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, green collar and piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; and white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Diego Pettitt.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Rafael Martinengo.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Lorenzo Flood.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Ultonia*

One battalion; date of formation: 1709; uniform: white coat with green cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet collar and piping, white lapels, and gilt buttons; a white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Juan Kindelán.<sup>2</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan Ponce de León.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan O'Donovan.

<sup>2</sup> Sent to Denmark in 1807 with the division of La Romana, Kindelán was one of the few officers who opposed its commander's decision to declare in favour of the Patriot cause and organise the division's escape by sea to England. Instead declaring for Joseph Bonaparte, he played a leading role in organising the latter's Spanish army and died in exile in France as a general of division.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Aragón*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1711; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, green collar and piping, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; and white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Luis de Aragón.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel the Marquess of Cruillas.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Gaspar Sainz.





*Regimiento de Infantería de América*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1764; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, purple collar and piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Juan José de San Juan.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Francisco Amaya.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Sebastián de Zaragoza.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Extremadura*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1766; uniform: white coat with buff lapels, cuffs and turnbacks, scarlet collar and piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier the Count of Torre del Fresno.<sup>3</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Andrés Saénz de Buruaga.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel de Copóns.

<sup>3</sup> Military governor of Badajoz in 1808, Torre del Fresno was an early proponent of resistance to the French in 1808, but his calls for revolt fell on deaf ears, and he was therefore reluctant to join the uprising when it finally broke out at the end of May, the result being that he was murdered by the angry populace.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Málaga*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1791; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, and piping, black collar, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel the Duke of Arión.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Juan-Bautista de Urruela.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Hernando.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Jaén*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1793; uniform: white coat with black lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet collar and piping, white lapels, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches. Raised for the war of 1793-95 by the Duque de Medinaceli.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Bernardo Hidalgo.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José Panes.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan María Ponce de León.





*Regimiento de Infantería de las Ordenes Militares*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1793; uniform: white coat with white lapels, scarlet collar cuffs and turn-backs, green piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches. Raised for the war of 1793-95 by the Council of the Military Orders.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Antonio Deza.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Bartolomé Solano.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don José Guvarre.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Voluntarios de Castilla*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1793; uniform: white coat with carmine lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, and white-metal buttons lapels; white waistcoat; white breeches. Raised for the war of 1793-95 by the Duque de Infantado.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Antonio Correa.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Antonio Pinillos.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Lechuga.





*Regimiento de Granaderos Voluntarios del Estado*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1794; uniform: blue coat with buff lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet piping and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Francisco Alonso.

Lieutenant Colonel: vacant.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Luis de Oyarzábal.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Borbón*

Three battalions; date of formation: 1796; uniform: blue coat with light blue lapels, scarlet cuffs and turn-backs, collar and lining; contrasting piping on the coats and plastrons, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches. Raised from the émigré Legión Real of the Count of Saint Simon.

Colonel: the Count of Caldagués.

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant Colonel the Viscount of Preissac.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Alejandro de Ogea.



***Regimiento de Infantería de Saboya***

Three battalions; date of formation 1537; uniform: white coat with black lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Pedro Adorno.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Carlos Lejún.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Vicente Martínez.

***Regimiento de Infantería de Zamora***

Three battalions; date of formation: 1580; uniform: white coat with black cuffs, turn-backs, collar and piping, white lapels and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Count of Vado.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Diego Reynaud.

Sergeant Major: Don José Imaz.<sup>4</sup>

***Regimiento de Infantería de Sevilla***

Three battalions; date of formation: 1591; uniform: white coat with black lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet collar and piping, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Jerónimo Peynado.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Pedro Dupin

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Montero.

***Regimiento de Infantería de Valencia***

Three battalions; date of formation: 1658; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs and turn-backs, buff collar and piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Luis Fernández de Córdoba.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Henrique de la Mata Linares.

Sergeant Major: Colonel Don Vicente de San Clemente.

***Regimiento de Infantería de Mallorca***

Three battalions; date of formation: 1682; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, and turn-backs, buff collar and piping, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat and white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don José Casamayor.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Francisco de la Roque.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan Trelles.

***Regimiento de Infantería de Irlanda***

Three battalions; date of formation: 1698; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turn-backs and collar, green piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Felix Jones.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Antonio O'Kelly.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Fitzgerald.

***Regimiento de Infantería de la Princesa***

Three battalions; date of formation: 1766; uniform: white coat with white lapels and collar, scarlet cuffs, turnbacks and piping, and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Count of Castrillo de Orgaz.

Lieutenant Colonel: Brigadier Count of San Román.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Luis Padilla.

***Regimiento de Cazadores Voluntarios de la Corona***

Two battalions; date of formation: 1795; uniform: blue jacket with white piping and scarlet frogging, cuffs, turnbacks, collars and pocket flaps; white waistcoat; blue leggings; round hat with a broad (white-metal?) band around the crown and the national cockade at the front. Colonel: Colonel Don Joaquín Blake.<sup>5</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant Colonel Don Francisco Soler.

Sergeant Major Don José O'Donnell.<sup>6</sup>

4 Imaz was very much one of the villains in Spain's struggle against Napoleon. Second-in-command of the garrison of Badajoz when it came under siege in 1811, he surrendered the city to the French following the death in action of the governor, Rafael de Menacho. This was despite the facts, first, that it was still capable of defence and, second, that a strong Anglo-Portuguese relief column was known to be only a few days march away. After 1815 a pillar of the absolutist cause, he helped put down the coup launched by Juan Díaz Porlier in 1815 and resisted the revolution of 1820.

5 Appointed to the command of the Army of Galicia on the outbreak of the uprising of 1808, Joaquín Blake went on to become one of the leading Spanish commanders of the Peninsular War, though his military career was one of almost uninterrupted defeat. Appointed in November 1810 to the Council of Regency that ruled Spain from January 1810 till the end of the war, he was captured at the fall of Valencia in January 1812 and for the next two years was held as a prisoner of war in the Chateau de Vincennes.

6 One of three O'Donnell brothers who fought for the Patriot cause in the Peninsular War, José O'Donnell rose to command the Spanish Third Army but was heavily defeated at the battle of Castalla on 18 July 1812.



## Light Infantry

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Much increased in the course of the war of 1793-95, not least in an attempt to mobilise the manpower of areas that did not provide many men to the regular army by other means, in 1800 the light infantry consisted of ten regiments, those of the First and Second Volunteers of Aragón, the First and Second Volunteers of Catalonia, the First and Second Volunteers of Barcelona; the Volunteers of Tarragona, the Volunteers of Gerona, the Volunteers of Barbastro and the Volunteers of Valencia. Unlike line-infantry regiments, however, light-infantry regiments only had a single battalion of six companies.

In 1800 as in 1808, they were for the most part dressed in blue, line-infantry style uniforms. Owing their origins not so much to the experience of eighteenth-century battle that had produced the same sort of forces elsewhere, as to the constant need to safeguard Spain from the depredations of her own native bandits on the one hand and the Barbary corsairs on the other, these units were dressed in a more comfortable fashion than the troops of the line. Notable features were the cut-down coat worn by the rank and file, the greatcoat normally worn draped over one shoulder, the leather gaiters issued to many units instead of the more common cloth ones, the wrap-around bandolier something in the style of the modern 'bum-bag' that took the place of the cartridge-box, and the manner in which the soldiers were generally allowed to wear their hair caught up in the traditional nets known as *redecillas* rather than being forced to endure the greased and floured pigtailed that were the normal hairstyle for the soldiers of the day. They were from 1792 onwards equipped with a modified musket that had a slightly longer barrel that made for improved accuracy and a cut-away stock that made for reduced weight.

Needless to say, the primary task of these troops was not action on the battlefield, but rather the raiding and other forms of *petite guerre* that typified eighteenth-century warfare away from the major field actions, and in this the Spaniards – like the Prussians – were to be badly outclassed by the French who were moving towards the integration of line and light infantry. Nor had much thought been given to the role that light troops might play on the battlefield: in this respect, perhaps, it is interesting that the first mention of the subject that we see in print is a translation of Grandmaison's famous treatise that appeared in Madrid in 1794.

Nevertheless, despite the deficiencies which this suggests, the light infantry still cut a certain dash. As Friedrich Fischer remarked of an unknown light regiment he saw in Badajoz in 1798, for example:

The Spanish soldiers wear no gaiters, no heavy cartouche boxes [ ... ] no stiff collar; their hair is not tied, nor have they heavy hair caps or three cornered caps. Their dress is adapted to the climate: a round hat half turned-up. [ ... ] They have not the spruce appearance of our German soldiers, but there is also less stiffness. They do not perhaps march with so much precision, but their movements have more lightness; they make less appearance on parade, but they conduct themselves equally well in the field of battle.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Fischer, *Travels in Spain*, p.267.





*Regimiento Primero de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Aragón*

One battalion; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with scarlet lapels, turn-backs, cuffs and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat, and breeches; dark-brown mantle; buff-leather gaiters; and red worsted sash.

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel de Peñas.

Sergeant Major: Don Bernabé de Inatez.





*Regimiento Segundo de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Cataluña*

One battalion; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with yellow lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches; grey greatcoats.

Commanding Officer: Colonel Don Jerónimo Verde.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Francisco de Trias.





*Regimiento Primero de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Barcelona*

One battalion; date of formation: 1793; uniform: bottle-green jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, contrasting piping, buff collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches; blue greatcoats.

Commanding Officer: Colonel Don Antonio de Miralles y Febres.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don José-María Desvalls.





*Regimiento de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Barbastro*

One battalion; date of formation: 1794; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with scarlet lapels, turn-backs, cuffs and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches; dark-brown overcoats; and buff-leather gaiter.  
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Don Ramón Orell.  
Sergeant Major: Don Miguel de Alcega.





*Regimiento de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Valencia*

One battalion; date of formation: 1794; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with white lapels, turn-backs, cuffs and collar and gilt buttons; white waistcoat, and breeches; dark-brown cloak; blue overcoats; black gaiters.

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Don Lino Vicente.

Sergeant Major: Don Francisco Javier Elío.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> A notorious conservative who insisted on wearing a pigtail till the end of his days and was executed for conspiring against the Revolution of 1820, Elío led the military coup that overthrew the Constitution of 1812 and restored absolutism in 1814.



***Regimiento Segundo de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Aragón***

One battalion; date of formation: 1793; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with scarlet lapels, turn-backs, cuffs and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches; dark-brown greatcoats; buff-leather gaiters.

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Don Luis Amat de Terán.

Sergeant Major: Don José de Muelas.

***Regimiento Primero de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Cataluña***

One battalion; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with yellow lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and collar and gilt buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches; grey greatcoats.

Commanding Officer: Colonel Don Francisco Terradellas.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don José Borrellas.

***Regimiento de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Tarragona***

One battalion; date of formation: 1792; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with yellow lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches; grey greatcoats.

Commanding Officer: Colonel Don José González.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Francisco Marco del Pont.<sup>3</sup>

***Regimiento de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Gerona***

One battalion; date of formation: 1792; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with yellow lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches; grey greatcoats.

Commanding Officer: Colonel Don José Joaquín Martí.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Narciso Basols.

***Regimiento Segundo de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Barcelona***

One battalion; date of formation: 1793; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with yellow lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches; blue greatcoats.

Commanding Officer: Colonel Don Casimiro Bofarull.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Narciso de la Valeta.

***Regimiento Segundo de Voluntarios de Infantería Ligera de Aragón***

One battalion; date of formation: 1793; uniform: blue jacket (officers and sergeants coat) with scarlet lapels, turn-backs, cuffs and collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches; dark-brown greatcoats; buff-leather gaiters.

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Don Luis Amat de Terán.

Sergeant Major: Don José de Muelas.

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<sup>3</sup> Separated from his unit, in 1809 Marco del Pont played some role in organising irregular resistance in southern Aragón, but was captured by the French and sentenced to death, only for his sentence to be commuted by Joseph Bonaparte.



## Swiss Infantry

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Like the French army prior to the Revolution, the Spanish army had long maintained a number of Swiss infantry regiments. Four in number in 1793 – those of Schwaller, Rutiman, Reding and Betschart – a further two regiments – those of Yann and Courten – were raised in the course of the struggle against France, each regiment having two battalions of one grenadier and five fusilier companies. Nor was their organization the only distinguishing feature of these troops, the regiments continuing to be distinguished by the names of their colonels. Until 1789 they had been raised by agreement with the authorities of the Catholic cantons of Switzerland from the inhabitants of those areas, but since Europe had descended into war their ethnicity had broken down completely. An eyewitness, Fischer paints a depressing picture:

As to the regiments calling themselves Swiss [ ... ] they consist almost entirely of Germans, and, excepting the officers there are not perhaps twenty that are Swiss. [ ... ] The recruiting trade carried on by the Swiss proprietors of these regiments, especially the families of Reding, Betschart, Rutiman, etc., in partnership with their recruiting agents, which is equally disgusting to our country and disgraceful to humanity, can only be exceeded by their malversations. While their recruiters are enlisting these wretched victims of cupidity by artifice and by force on the frontiers of Germany, Switzerland and Italy, these opulent financiers are enriching themselves with the price of our blood, and the officers deprive the poor fellows by a thousand artifices and subtleties of at least a fifth of their pay. They publically sell the discharges they grant, but refuse them to the indigent, paying no attention to the engagements they enter into with them. However, as there are always persons whom they permit to purchase the debts they cause them to contract with the regimental chest, they possess the secret of perpetually postponing their discharge. From time to time ships arrive at Barcelona from Genoa entirely loaded with recruits and the profits of these dealers in human flesh are renewed as often as they can thus impudently impose upon the government. [ ... ] If I were to lay open the black tissue of their flagrant injustice and atrocious acts, were I amply to portray the horrors they practise, and describe all the scenes of misery and despair that take place at the barracks, you would perhaps accuse me of exaggeration, and very few would be able justly to appreciate the accuracy of my expressions.<sup>1</sup>

Equally scathing, meanwhile, was the German traveller, Johann Kessler:

There are six Swiss regiments. [ ... ] All of them up to strength, they are recruited on the basis of Austrian deserters and prisoners of war ... In many of them, apart from the officers, it is not possible to find more than 100 genuine Swiss. Be this as it may, I do not understand why the Spanish Crown spends so much money on maintaining so many Swiss regiments when the Spanish soldier, if well-led, is so superior in valour and fidelity.<sup>2</sup>

That said, even Kessler was prepared to admit that the Swiss were 'good troops', while his compatriot, Texier, went still further: 'The only unit in Madrid that may be termed excellent is a Swiss infantry regiment: the beauty of its men, the cleanliness of its uniforms and the standard of its bearing are all really striking.'<sup>3</sup>

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1 Fischer, *Travels in Spain*, pp.267-9.

2 Friedrich-Stegmann, *Imagen de España*, p.130.

3 Friedrich-Stegmann, *Imagen de España*, p. 131.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Rutiman*

Two battalions; date of formation: 1742; uniform: "blue coat with scarlet lapels, collar, cuffs, turnbacks, lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.

Colonel: Major General Don Christobal Rutiman.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Antonio Gramaren.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Jaime Stoffel.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Reding*

Two battalions; date of formation: 1742; uniform: blue coat with scarlet collar, lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and lining, and white-metal buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.

Colonel: Major General Don Teodoro de Reding.<sup>4</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Nazario de Reding

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan Werner, Barón de Worster.

<sup>4</sup> In 1808 the governor of Málaga, in the wake of the uprising Reding was given the command of a division and went on to play a leading role in the defeat of the French at Bailén. Later sent to Catalonia, he was mortally wounded at the battle of Valls on 25 February 1809, sustaining no fewer than five sabre cuts.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Betschart*

Two battalions; date of formation: 1742; uniform: blue coat with yellow lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collar and lining, and white-metal buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Domingo de Betschart.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Carlos de Reding.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant-Colonel Don Juan Wohlehen.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Yann*

Two battalions; date of formation: 1742; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and collar, white lining, piping and collar, and gilt buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Carlos Yann.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Jorge Traxler.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don José O'Reilly.





*Regimiento de Infantería de Courten*

Two battalions; date of formation: 1796; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and lining, blue collar, white piping, and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches.

Colonel: Major General Don Juan Antonio de Courten.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José Elías de Courten.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Francisco José Marcos de Courten.



*Regimiento de Infantería de Schwaller*

Two battalions; date of formation: 1734; uniform: "blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and piping, straw-coloured collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; white breeches.

Colonel: Major General Don Francisco José de Schwaller.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Antonio Schmidt

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Pedro Kully



## Cavalry

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If the Spanish infantry was very much a conventional force, so was the Spanish cavalry. Of cavalry proper, there were twelve line regiments in 1800 – those of Rey, Reina, Príncipe, Infante, Borbón, Farnesio, Alcántara, España, Algarve, Calatrava, Santiago, and Montesa – each of which was composed of three squadrons. Dressed in white like the line infantry (a decision dating only to 1796 when the need to give the cavalry fresh uniforms in the wake of the war against France had produced the choice of white – i.e. natural wool – as the cheapest option available), these forces relied entirely on Frederician-style shock action instead of the French system of volleys of carbine and pistol fire that had been favoured in the first half of the eighteenth century: when attacking the enemy, they were to charge home at speed ‘with sword in hand and much courage’. According to the army’s tactical regulations, meanwhile, regiments were to be able to move and change formation at the trot or even the gallop, to manoeuvre in column and to fight in line, whilst by the time that the war broke out there were strong suggestions that the carbines that they carried should be thrown away as an encumbrance.<sup>1</sup>

If mobile firepower was required, this was supposed to be the work of the eight regiments of yellow-uniformed dragoons, namely those of Rey, Reina, Almansa, Pavía, Villaviciosa, Sagunto, Numancia, and Lusitania. Organised in three squadrons like the cavalry, they were in theory trained to use firepower both in the saddle and on foot – indeed, in the latter case, they were even supposed to form line of battle like the infantry – and this may explain why they came to enjoy such an evil reputation as mounted troops.<sup>2</sup> Given the limited role played by mounted troops in the war of 1793-95, the failure to train the dragoons adequately for their primary role was not apparent at this point. Of more immediate concern was their yellow uniforms: not only was the colour deemed unmilitary, but it showed dirt and stains all too readily, the result being that, in the course of his appointment as Inspector of Cavalry, Godoy’s brother, Diego, proposed that they should be issued with green uniforms instead.<sup>3</sup>

Last but not least, there were two four-squadron regiments of cavalry – those of Voluntarios de España and the Costa de Granada – that had originally been raised for the constant struggle against banditry, and, in the case of the latter the raids of the Barbary corsairs (still a serious issue in Spain as late as the mid-eighteenth century), one regiment of carabinieri – that of Reina María Luisa – and one regiment of hussars – the Husares Españoles, both of these last two units dating from the war against France. But in general the only mounted troops that were to be relied upon at all were the Guardias de Corps and the Carabineros Reales, this being because they always received the cream of the available horseflesh, whereas their counterparts in the line had to make do with the weakly nags to which centuries of mule breeding had reduced the bulk of the equine population. Just as well, then, that the cavalry of the Revolution was hardly its most potent weapon, and, further, that the Pyrenean frontier was not the place for great cavalry actions.<sup>4</sup>

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1 *Ordenanzas*, Section V, Parts 3-4, *passim*; ‘Memoria sobre la caballería presentada al Excmo. Sr. D. Jerónimo Caballero, por el Vizconde Dambly, comandante de escuadra que ha sido de caballería francesa’, 26 February 1790, Real Academia de Historia 2-MS135, No. 5.

2 Real Academia de Historia 2-MS135, No. 5. *Ordenanzas*, Section V, Part 10, clauses 1-59.

3 See ‘1800. Los Regimientos de Dragones’ at <http://losejercitosdelrey.es/1800-los-regimientos-de-dragones/> accessed 22 July 2016.

4 For a useful general account of the cavalry’s development in the reign of King Charles III, see J. Armillas Vicente and C. Corona Baratech (eds.), *La España de las reformas hasta el final del reinado de Carlos IV* (Madrid: Rialp, 1990), pp. 156-8.





*Regimiento de Caballería del Rey*

Three squadrons; date of formation 1538; uniform: white coat with purple lapels, cuffs, turn-backs and collar, scarlet lining and piping and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Miguel de Gamboa.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Joaquín Romero.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Julián de Vera.





*Regimiento de Caballería de la Reina*

Three squadrons; date of formation 1703; uniform: white coat with purple lapels and collar, white cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet lining and piping and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Pascual de la Vega.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Diego Camillo.

Sergeant Major: Colonel Don Francisco Mariano.





*Regimiento de Caballería del Príncipe*

Date of formation: 1703; uniform: white coat with white lapels, purple cuffs, turn-backs, and collar; scarlet lining and piping and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Buenaventura Alvarez de Toledo.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Manuel de Ribera.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Joaquín Ayans de Ureta.





*Regimiento de Caballería de Borbón*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1640; uniform: white coat with white lapels, scarlet cuffs, turn-backs, collar, lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Carlos Aguado.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José Ortiz.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Joaquín Ayans de Ureta.





*Regimiento de Caballería de Farnesio*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1649; uniform: white coat with white lapels and collar, scarlet cuffs, turn-backs, lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Raimundo Capeche de Minutolo.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José Manso..

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Pedro Lecoq.





*Regimiento de Caballería de España*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1659; uniform: white coat with black lapels, collar, cuffs and turn-backs; scarlet lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Luis Idiáquez.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Bartolomé de Castro.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Joaquín Astraudí.





*Regimiento de Caballería de Algarve*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1701; uniform: white coat with buff lapels and collar, scarlet cuffs, turn-backs, lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don José Nueros.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Joaquín Fernández de Castro.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Raimundo Carbonell.





*Regimiento de Caballería de Calatrava*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1703; uniform: white coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turn-backs collar, lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don José-María Bucareli.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José Yebra.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonion Retana.





*Regimiento de Caballería de Santiago*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1703; uniform: white coat with carmine lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, and collar; scarlet lining and piping and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Daniel Macdonnell

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Francisco Cortabarría.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan de Morales.





*Regimiento de Caballería de Montesa*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1706; uniform: white coat with blue lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and collar, scarlet lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don José-Benito Zarauz..

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Alonso Terán Quevedo.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don José Colomina.





*Regimiento de Caballería de Voluntarios de España*

Four squadrons; date of formation: 1762; uniform: white coat with green lapels; yellow collar, cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Luis-María Solís.

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan-Christóforo Alippi.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Felipe Polanco.





*Regimiento de Carabineros de la Reina María Luisa*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1793; uniform: white coat with light-blue lapels, collar, cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Marqués de Monsalud.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Vicente Cabacelice.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don José Badolato.





*Regimiento de Dragones de la Reina*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1735; uniform: yellow coat with yellow lapels, light blue collar, cuffs, turnbacks and piping, scarlet lining, and white-metal buttons; yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier the Count of Noroña.

Lieutenant Colonel: Brigadier Don Diego de Arracho.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Cuevas.





*Regimiento de Dragones de Almansa*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1676; uniform: yellow coat with yellow lapels, dark blue collar, cuffs, turnbacks and piping, scarlet lining and white-metal buttons; yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Pedro Buck y O'Donnell.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Martín de Vergara.

Sergeant Major: Colonel the Marquess of Malespina.





*Regimiento de Dragones de Villaviciosa*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1689; uniform: yellow coat with green lapels, collar, cuffs, turnbacks and piping, scarlet lining and white-metal buttons; yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don José-Luis de Miñano.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Pedro Junco.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Francisco Pastor.





*Regimiento de Dragones de Sagunto*

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1703; uniform: yellow coat with green lapels, collar, cuffs, turnbacks and piping, scarlet lining, and white-metal buttons; yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Jacinto de Irisarri.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Ramón de Avilés.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel Galiano.



***Regimiento de Caballería del Infante***

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1642; uniform: white coat with white lapels and collar, purple cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet lining and piping and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Manuel María de Tovar.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Miguel Clairac.

Sergeant Major: Colonel Don Alfonso Fernández de Córdoba.

***Regimiento de Caballería de Alcántara***

Three squadrons; created 1703; uniform: white coat with green lapels, cuffs, turn-backs, and collar, scarlet lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Hermenegildo Hurtado de Mendoza.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Juan Francisco Navarrete

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Ramón Aoiz de Zuza.

***Regimiento de Caballería de la Costa de Granada***

Four squadrons; date of formation: 1735; uniform: white coat with green cuffs and turn-backs, scarlet collar, lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; white cape; buff waistcoat; buff breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Joaquín Escovedo.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don Ramón de Monsalve.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan Tenorio.

***Regimiento de Husares Españoles***

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1795; uniform: blue pelisse with red collar and frogging and lambswool lining and trim; buff jacket with blue collar scarlet cuffs, turn-backs, lining and piping, and white-metal buttons; blue cape; blue breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Marqués del Palacio.<sup>5</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Benito San Juan.<sup>6</sup>

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel Freyre.<sup>7</sup>

***Regimiento de Dragones del Rey***

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1674; uniform: yellow coat with yellow lapels, purple collar, cuffs, turnbacks and piping, scarlet lining, and white-metal buttons; yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier Don Ramón de Villalba.

Lieutenant Colonel: Colonel Don José-Ignacio de March.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel de Beccar

***Regimiento de Dragones de Pavía***

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1684; uniform: yellow coat with yellow lapels, scarlet collar, cuffs, turnbacks, lining and piping and white-metal buttons yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Tomas Jauregui.

Lieutenant Colonel: Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan Mauduit.

Sergeant Major: Colonel Don Pedro Manuel de Rosales.

***Regimiento de Dragones de Numancia***

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1707; uniform: yellow coat with black lapels, collar, cuffs and turnbacks, yellow piping, scarlet lining, and white-metal buttons; yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Colonel Don Gaspar Alvarez de Sotomayor.

Lieutenant Colonel: Brigadier Don Antonio Alvarez de Bohorqués.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel de San Juan.

***Regimiento de Dragones de Lusitania***

Three squadrons; date of formation: 1709; uniform: yellow coat with yellow lapels, black collar, cuffs, turnbacks and piping, scarlet lining and white-metal buttons; yellow cape; white waistcoat; white breeches.

Colonel: Brigadier the Marquess of Cuellar.

Lieutenant Colonel: vacant.

Sergeant Major: Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel Rizo.

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- 5 Described in one unkind British source as a 'fat and unwieldy marquess', the Marqués del Palacio occupied a series of prominent military commands in the Peninsular War, but showed little in the way of military talent and was increasingly regarded as a something of a figure of fun on account of his habit of declaiming appalling poetic odes of his own composition on public occasions. A fanatical opponent of the reforms of the *cortes* of Cádiz, his least distinguished moment came on 29 May 1810 when he paraded through the streets of that city dressed in mock-mediaeval garb in an attempt to inspire the inhabitants to return to the customs and usages of the past.
- 6 Placed in command of the remains of the Army of Extremadura in the wake of the Battle of Gamonal in November 1808, Benito San Juan was defeated by Napoleon at the Somosierra pass and murdered by his own troops in the retreat that followed.
- 7 In the course of the Peninsular War, Freyre eventually rose to the command of the Spanish Fourth Army and in this capacity collaborated with Wellington in his operations in the Pyreness in the autumn of 1813.



## Provincial Militia

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Only mobilised in time of war and composed solely of infantry, the provincial militia had originally been created in 1734, and by 1800 consisted of forty-eight regiments, although the last six dated only from 1798, when Godoy had extended the system to the Kingdom of Valencia (a decision that was to spark off a serious peasant revolt in the autumn of 1801).

Each regiment was composed of a single battalion composed of one grenadier and eight fusilier companies, it being customary for the grenadier companies to be drawn off to serve in separate battalions. Recruitment was by ballot, the various component parts of the domains of the crown of Castile (an arrangement that excluded the Basque provinces, Navarre, Catalonia and, until 1798, Valencia) being expected to maintain a number of regiments proportionate to their population. In the course of the eighteenth century, there had been much criticism of the institution on military grounds – it was, for example, argued that the officers, all of whom were representatives of the landed classes of the provinces from which each regiment was raised – were, at best, well-meaning amateurs and, at worst, opportunists out only to make what use they could of their appointments to reinforce their social and economic interests – but in fact militia units do not seem to have performed much worse than their regular counterparts. That said, there was also much criticism of the force on social and political grounds. The ballot, which was much hated, was seen as a threat to public order and service in the militia as a means of communicating the vices associated with soldiering to a supposedly pure and innocent rural population.<sup>1</sup>

As all regiments wore the same uniform – a blue coat with scarlet lapels, collars, cuffs, and turnbacks and gilt buttons; white waistcoat and breeches and either a bearskin (grenadiers) or a cocked hat (fusiliers) – they are not listed individually here. That said, the full list (by year of formation) was as follows:

1734: Badajoz, Betanzos, Bujalance, Burgos, Ciudad Rodrigo, Córdoba, Ecija, Guadix, Granada, Jaén, Jérez, Laredo, León, Lugo, Logroño, Málaga, Murcia, Orense, Oviedo, Pontevedra, Ronda, Santiago, Sevilla, Sigüenza, Soria, Toledo, Toro, Trujillo, Tuy.

1766: Avila, Alcázar de San Juan, Chinchilla, Ciudad Real, Compostela, Cuenca, Lorca, Mallorca, Mondoñedo, Monterey, Plasencia, Salamanca, Segovia, Valladolid.

1798: Alcira, Alicante y Orihuela, Castellón de la Plana, San Felipe, Segorbe, Valencia,

Amongst the officer corps, a few names are worth noting as having some relevance in the Peninsular War. For example, having fought in such battles as Ocaña and the passage of the Sierra Morena, the Sergeant Major of the Málaga infantry regiment, Francisco Copóns y Navía, was eventually appointed to the command of the First Army (the Spanish forces based in Catalonia) and was therefore the officer who officially welcomed Ferdinand VII back to Spain when he was released from captivity in March 1814. Equally, in 1800 lieutenant colonel of the Alcázar de San Juan regiment, Juan Senen de Contreras was the governor of Tarragona when it was attacked by the French in the summer of 1811 and put up a gallant fight before finally being overwhelmed on 28 June.

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<sup>1</sup> For the provincial militia, see J. Contreras Gay, 'Las milicias en el antiguo regimen: modelos, característicos generales y significado histórico', *Crónica Nueva*, XX, (1992), pp. 75-103. Also helpful is *Real declaración sobre puntos esenciales de la ordenanza de milicias provinciales de España que interin se regla la formal que corresponde a estos cuerpos se debe observar como tal en todas sus partes*, 30 May 1767.





*Milicias Provinciales*



## Garrison and Security Forces

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In living memory Spain was an example of a country whose police and security forces were strongly militarised: in both the rural gendarmerie known as the Civil Guard and its successive urban equivalents, officers were men on secondment from the army and the rank and file drawn very largely from erstwhile sergeants and corporals; equally, far from being limited to pistols and revolvers, their armament habitually extended to rifles and machine-guns. This is not the place to enter into a long discussion of the roots of this situation. Suffice to say that examination of the *estados militares* of Bourbon Spain suggests that it has a very long history. In the reign of King Charles IV, then, public order depended on a variety of armed forces that in many instances formed an integral part of the army and were expected to perform the duty of garrison troops.

Let us begin with the more formal parts of this array. Here the obvious place to begin is with the numerous companies of invalids. Subdivided into two categories – in brief, *habiles* and *inhabiles* (i.e. ‘fit’ and ‘unfit’) – these units served as refuges for time-expired soldiers who would otherwise simply be turned out into the streets and thereby condemned to joining the mass of beggars to be found in every town and city. In exchange (at least, in theory) for the performance of a variety of light duties – mounting guard, patrolling the streets, and escorting prisoners and convoys – they received food, pay and accommodation. In the absence of any equivalent to Les Invalides or the Royal Military Hospital, some such arrangement was inevitable – indeed, even morally desirable – but to expect very much from these units was at best unwise. To quote Johann Kessler once again:

The corps of able-bodied invalids has thirty-two companies [sic: the actual number was forty-four]. All the men of this force have muskets although they do but carry out light duties in various fortresses. It is not even clear what their real strength is as the soldiers have the right to choose whether to continue in the service or to claim their pension. [ ... ] On top of this force there is a corps of disabled invalids [ ... ] composed of men who can no longer render any service at all. [ ... ] They have no muskets and do nothing, and yet they receive the same benefits as the rest of the infantry.<sup>1</sup>

Joining the invalids in their duties, meanwhile, were the even more numerous companies of urban militia. Essentially units of volunteers who served on a part-time basis, these could in many instances trace their history back to the seventeenth century or even earlier, but their organization was standardised by Charles III in the early 1760s in response to the enormous growth in their numbers occasioned by the War of the Spanish Succession and the Seven Years War. Recruitment was in the hands of the town councils or, on occasion, the guilds, and was never the problem that it was for the regular army. Men accepted for the urban militia were exempt from conscription to the army and provincial militia and had access to the coveted *fuero militar* – in essence, the right to be tried in the army’s separate system of courts and, with this, the near guarantee of preferential treatment in cases in which they came into conflict with civilians – as well as a guarantee that such military service as they had to perform would be limited to their home towns and cities. As can readily be imagined, control of the urban militias represented an important source of patronage to the élites who dominated guilds and town councils alike, and all the more so as they played a major part in selecting the officers.

Whether much use was ever gleaned from these forces is a moot point, however: at best, they could have been but an auxiliary force, and they are but little heard of in the fighting of the Peninsular War. In the end it is entirely probable that their impact was actually negative. One thinks here of recruitment to the regular army: in 1767 it was decreed that all towns that possessed companies of *urbanas* should be excluded from the ballot for the provincial

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<sup>1</sup> Friedrich-Stegmann, *Imagen de España*, p. 133.



militia, whilst in some places so many men were taken by them – in Tarifa, for example, 400 men out of a total male population of a mere 2,000 – that few men can have been left available for the *sorteo*, this problem being compounded by the fact that no effort was made to limit recruitment to the *urbanas* to, say, married men only. Indeed, by creating a mass of *privilegiados* who were exempt from the draft, it is probable that the existence of these units made conscription even more hated than it was already. Such problems, however, were ignored, the war of 1793-95 seeing the formation of still more units, such as, for example, the six companies that appeared in Marbella, and that despite the fact that there was clear evidence from around the country that the urban militias were everywhere poorly trained and in many cases lacking even in weapons, and also that their officers in many cases had no military experience whatsoever and owed their appointment to nothing more than nepotism. In the case of one unit raised in 1793, it was discovered that a local magistrate had secured a captaincy for one of his sons and lieutenantcies for two more, and that despite the fact that they were aged just eleven, nine, and four.<sup>2</sup>

A mixture of more-or-less broken-down old soldiers and place-men guaranteed freedom from military service, neither the corps of invalids or the urban militias could be expected to add much to Spain's defence. At best, indeed, they could be expected to maintain some degree of public order in the towns and cities in which they were stationed. In some ways, however, the various security forces employed for a similar purpose in the countryside (at least, for the most part: there were some units that were in effect little different from the companies of *milicias urbanas*) were no more effective. Known collectively as the *resguardo*, these consisted of a number of independent companies whose task it was to hunt down bandits and smugglers. This to some extent they no doubt did, but at the same time they were often themselves recruited from the ranks of the very people they were supposed to fight and were in consequence all too often inclined to slip into a variety of forms of racketeering whilst at the same time acting as hired thugs in the service of assorted members of the local élites. A further problem, meanwhile, was that that they had sprung up over the course of the eighteenth century in ever greater numbers and without the slightest degree of central control, some areas being left utterly unprovided for whilst others positively swarmed with them. As for quality, some were reasonably effective and others worse than useless. In military terms, whilst a few elements from their ranks took part in such actions as the first siege of Zaragoza in 1808, little could be expected from them, other, perhaps, than to provide a certain cadre for irregular warfare. In fairness, however, it should be noted that the *resguardo* did produce one of the most colourful Spanish generals of the war in the person of Francisco Ballesteros, a retired customs officer who was awarded the rank of brigadier by the Junta of Asturias in 1808 and by 1812 had become the commander of the Fourth Army, in which capacity he famously tried to lead a revolt in protest at the appointment of the Duke of Wellington to the command of the Spanish armies in September 1812.<sup>3</sup>

It should be noted that the forces included in the *estados militares* do not include all the men employed in the sort of activity to which they were supposedly dedicated: in 1756, for example, the state tobacco monopoly possessed the services of a gendarmerie some 2,800-strong organised in twenty-three different units.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, a word on nomenclature. *Milicia urbana* – 'urban militia' – should be clear enough, but some of the other designations are more obscure. A *compañía fija*, then, was a 'fixed company' – i.e. a static force available only for duty within the bounds of the town in which it was raised – and a *compañía suelta* an independent company. Finally, in one or two cases, there is the type of soldier which made up the unit: like *milicia urbana*, *fusilero* – fusilier – should present no difficulties and was in fact based on the same premise as the English-language usage, namely, a unit armed with a 'fusee' or light-weight version of the standard musket, but *escopetero* defies translation. A direct equivalent would be 'shot-gunner' and this may well imply that the men concerned were originally armed with a haphazard collection of civilian weapons. Whether this was still the case in 1800 is unclear, so a better term might be auxiliaries or constables.

2 C. Corona Marzol, 'Las milicias urbanas de la baja Andalucía en el siglo XVII', in I. Marín Marina (ed.), *Milicia y sociedad en la baja Andalucía, siglos XVIII y XIX: VIII Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar* (Sevilla: Editorial Deimos, 1999), pp.377-89.

3 E. Martínez Ruiz and M.P. Pi Corrales, 'Milicia y orden pública: crisis en el sistema de seguridad español del siglo XVIII y el expediente de reforma', *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna*, Vol.XXIX (2004), pp. 7-44; M.P. Pi Corrales, 'Unidades y cuerpos militares especiales en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII: aproximación al marco institucional del orden y la seguridad pública', in E. Martínez Ruiz et al (eds.), *Los ejércitos y las armadas de España y Suecia en una época de cambios* (Ciudad Real: Fundación Berndt Wistedt, 2001), pp.69-90.

4 J.M. Rodríguez Gordillo, *La difusión del tabaco en España: diez estudios* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2002), pp. 269-70.





*Milicia Urbana de Puerto de Santa María*

Nine companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue coat with white lapels, cuffs and turnbacks, black collar, and silver buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.





*Milicia Urbana del Campo de Gibraltar*

Thirteen companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue coat with yellow lapels, cuffs and turnbacks, black collars and gilt buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.





*Milicia Urbana de Ceuta*

Five companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collar, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.





*Milicia Urbana de Badajoz*

Fourteen companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collar, lining, and piping and white-metal buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.





*Milicia Urbana de Alburquerque*

Eight companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue coat with white lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, lining and piping, black collars and white-metal buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.





*Milicia Urbana de Alcántara*

Six companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: white coat with green lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, lining and piping, black collar and white-metal buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.





*Compañías Fijas de Infantería de la Costa de Granada*

Eleven companies; date of formation 1762; uniform: blue coats with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks and lining, buff collars and piping, and white-metal buttons.





*Companía Fija de Escopeteros de Getares*

One company; date of formation 1705; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; white waistcoats; blue breeches.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Raised in the seventeenth century as a protection against the raids of the Barbary pirates, this force took its name from its heroic defence of the beach of Getares in the British attack on Gibraltar in 1704. Its uniform continues to be worn on ceremonial occasions by the municipal police of Algeciras.





*Compañía Suelta de Fusileros de Aragón*

One company; date of formation: 1766; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; scarlet waistcoats; blue breeches; white gaiters.





*Compañías de Infantería de los Presidios Menores*

Three companies; blue coat with white lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.





*Cuerpo de Escopeteros de Andalucía*

Two companies; date of formation: 1776; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.





*Compañía Suelta de Castilla la Nueva*

One company; date of formation: 1792; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.





*Invalidos Hábiles*

Forty-four companies; uniform: blue coat with white cuffs and turnbacks and white-metal buttons; white waistcoats; blue breeches.



***Milicia Urbana de Cádiz***

Twenty companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue coat with white lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collar, lining and piping, gold lace and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

***Milicia Urbana de Cartagena***

Nine companies; date of formation: 1762; uniform: blue coat with white lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collar, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.

***Milicia Urbana de La Coruña***

Twelve companies; date of formation: 1766; uniform: blue coat with white lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collar, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; white waistcoat; white breeches.

***Milicia Urbana de Valencia de Alcántara***

Seven companies; date of formation: 1766; uniform: blue coat with white lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, lining and piping, black collars and white-metal buttons; blue waistcoat; blue breeches.

***Milicia Urbana de Ciudad Rodrigo***

Six companies; date of formation: 1768; uniform: blue coat with buff lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, lining and piping, black collars and gilt buttons; blue breeches.

***Milicia Urbana de Tarifa***

Four companies; date of formation 1769; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.

***Compañía Fija de Caballería de Lanzas de Ceuta***

One company; date of formation: 1584; uniform: blue coat with scarlet lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and gilt buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.<sup>6</sup>

***Compañía Fija de Caballería de Moros Mogataces***

One company; date of formation, 1734; uniform: native dress.<sup>7</sup>

***Invalidos Inhabiles***

Twenty-six companies; blue coat with white lapels, cuffs, turnbacks, collars, lining, and piping and white-metal buttons; blue waistcoats; blue breeches.

<sup>6</sup> A light-cavalry unit equipped with lancers.

<sup>7</sup> Roughly translatable as the 'Company of Moorish Renegades', the Compañía de Moros Mogataces were the first native troops formally to serve in the ranks of the Spanish army. See E. Arqués and N. Giberet, *Los mogataces: los primitivos soldados moros de España en Africa* (Málaga: Editorial Algazara, 1992).



## Appendix I

# Artillery, Engineers, and Astronomers

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It is unfortunate that two entire arms of service are all but entirely missing from the album, these being of course, the artillery and engineers. Beginning with the former, in 1800, discounting the Guard's solitary horse-artillery battery, the artillery consisted of the single Regimiento Real de Artillería. Made up of seven field battalions – five of which had seven companies of foot artillery, and the other two five companies of foot artillery and two of horse artillery – seven independent garrison companies, and a single cadet company, this force was very well equipped thanks to the guns provided for by the Nueva Ordenanza. Although new guns were beginning to reach the British Army which were set to tip it into second place, in 1800 the Gribeauval system was still the best in the world, and a start had been made on converting some of the four-pounders into 'licornes': cannon that could fire shell as well as shot. All accounts agree that the crews of this force were of the highest quality – the officers, in particular, were all graduates of the extremely well-regarded artillery academy at Segovia – but this was somewhat nullified by a serious lack of mobility. Except in the few horse-artillery batteries, there was no permanent artillery train, and the guns were therefore pulled by a variety of horses, oxen, and mules that were hired from civilian sources on the outbreak of war along with their drivers. To expect such men to expose themselves on the battlefield was optimistic in the extreme, and all the more so in the event of the fighting going the way of the enemy. The result was that defeats such as those which the army suffered at Peyrestortes and Le Boulou in 1793 and 1794 always saw the loss of many valuable cannon.<sup>1</sup>

Moving on, we come to the engineers or Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros. In so far as the composition of this body was concerned, at this point, as in the British Army of the time, there were no rank and file, but only officers, though these last enjoyed a considerable reputation for technical excellence, whilst they had been employed on a wide variety of public works. Setting aside fortress construction – their most recent creation was the extraordinary Castillo de Santa Engracia, a completely impregnable fortress perched on a mountain top overlooking a crucial defile on the main road from the French frontier – it was members of the Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros who were responsible for the excellent highways that linked Madrid to cities such as Seville, Valencia, and La Coruña; for the semaphore telegraph running between the capital and the vital port of Cádiz; for the new agricultural colonies that were set up as an anti-bandit device in the wilds of the Sierra Morena (the most well known was the town of La Carolina); and for the quays of Barcelona with, just beside them, the planned suburb of Barceloneta.<sup>2</sup>

Whilst the album does not include any images of the artillery or engineers as such, they both wore dark blue uniforms with red collars, cuffs, and turnbacks, the only difference is that the former had yellow lace (gold for officers) and the latter silver. The one exception for which we do have an image, is the so-called 'Royal Corps of Cosmographic Engineers'. A branch of the corps of engineers-proper, this was one of the odder parts of the Spanish armed forces. In the Europe of the Enlightenment, interest in the physical world and the natural sciences was enormous, and in Spain matters were no different. As elsewhere, the lead tended to come from the state, and in 1790 the government of Charles IV had duly established a modern observatory in the gardens of the Retiro palace in Madrid. Given the strong interest of the navy in navigation, it was but a short step from here to the formation of a national institute of astronomy. Hence the appearance of the Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros Cosmógrafos in 1796, the task of this body being to investigate and further develop the theory and practice of astronomy, to train new astronomers, and to examine the manner in which astronomical knowledge could be applied in a practical manner in such fields as navigation,

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1 For some favourable contemporary comment in respect of the artillery, see Bourgoing, *Modern State of Spain*, Vol. I, p.71 and J. Townsend, *A Journey through Spain in 1786 and 1787* (London: C. Dilly, 1792), Vol. II, p.278.

2 See H. Capel Sáez et al, *De Palas a Minerva: la formación científica y la estructura institucional de los ingenieros militares en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), and H. Capel Sáez, *Los ingenieros militares en España, siglo XVIII* (Barcelona: Edicions Universitat Barcelona, 1983).



medicine, agriculture, and geography. As for staff, this consisted of a director (none other than Godoy himself), a vice-director, six professors, four deputy professors and twelve aspirant professors, all personnel other than Godoy being serving members of the corps of engineers on secondment. For reasons that are not clear, the corps was suppressed in 1804, but, for all that, Spain can lay some claim to having run the earliest space programme in the entire world.<sup>3</sup>

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3 See M. Martín Peña, *Historia del Cuerpo de Ingenieros Geógrafos, 1900-2010* (Madrid: Cultiva Libros, 2011), pp.16-17.





*Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros Cosmosgrafos de Estado*



## Appendix 2

# Developments in the Uniforms of the Spanish Army, 1800-1808

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Readers of this book will probably be familiar with the much better known uniforms worn by the Spanish army in 1808. In many instances, these were very different: the line cavalry, for example, now wore blue uniforms instead of white and the provincial militia white instead of blue, while some of the light infantry, at least, wore a distinctive green dolman decorated with hussar-style frogging and a crested helmet of the sort known in the British army as a 'tarleton'. At the same time, meanwhile, several of the cavalry regiments experienced changes in their denomination that were accompanied by dramatic changes in uniform: the Voluntarios del Estado regiment switched from being a *de facto* line regiment to being one of *cazadores*, while the Carabineros de la Reina María Luisa became a hussar unit.

Yet more confusion, meanwhile, was caused by the fact that a large part of the army experienced not one but two changes in uniform between 1800 and 1808: in 1802, for example, the line infantry were in theory issued with a uniform in the form of a mid-blue coat faced black, only to have this switched back to the previous white uniform five years later; equally, in the same year the light infantry received the green uniforms mentioned above only to have them changed for blue ones in 1807, the same year seeing the issue of shakos rather cocked hats. The reflection of a period of turmoil in the army in which Godoy, whose successes in the War of the Oranges had led to him being given *carte blanche* to engage in military reform, fought a series of battles with assorted vested interests, these frequent changes have led to much confusion among uniformologists, and all the more so as the most readily available source – the numerous drawings and sketches generated by the dispatch of a Spanish army to Denmark in 1807 – show the army as it appeared in the period 1805-1807 rather than as it did in 1808 – hence the insistence of many works on military uniforms on showing the light infantry in the Tarleton helmets and green dolmans of 1804 rather than the shakos and dark blue coatees of 1807, the latter only being issued after the men sent to Denmark had left the country. Add to this the facts, first, that difficulties of supply and shortage of money meant that many units continued to wear their old uniforms long after they were supposed to have been replaced, and, second, that the rapid influx of new recruits consequent upon the uprising resulted in a situation in which half a battalion might go into action wearing tail coats and cocked hats and the other half fatigue jackets and forage caps, and it will be understood that in 1808 the army presented a picture that was harlinquiesque indeed.<sup>1</sup>

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1 For a beautifully illustrated book that contains reproductions of the German and Danish illustrations mentioned in the text, see S. Summerfield (ed.), *Spanish Infantry of the Early Peninsular War: Uniforms, Organization and Equipment of the Line and Militia* (Godmanchester: Ken Trotman, 2016).



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
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